Tags : Morocco Leaks, Russia, Western Sahara, Fishing, Security Council,
Introduction
The twists and turns of the national question over the past three years highlight the importance for Morocco to review its alliances among the key powers on the United Nations Security Council.
The makeup of the Security Council and the scope of debates within it reflect a weakening of the P3—United States, France, and the United Kingdom—control over the Western Sahara issue, and a resurgence of Russia and China.
It is therefore important for the Kingdom to strengthen its strategic partnership with Russia.
This strengthening should not be seen as an alternative to strong relationships with other permanent members (France/United States). Rather, it is about supplementing these traditional alliances and diversifying partnerships, taking into account changing international realities and the Kingdom’s best interests.
Admittedly:
Morocco does not share as many values with Russia as it does with its traditional allies.
On a number of regional and international issues, Morocco’s position diverges from that of Russia (Syria, Iran, etc.).
However:
Russia is an indispensable player in the Security Council.
Its view of the UN’s actions is close to that of Morocco.
It currently defends the principles upheld by Morocco.
It is in this context that the Russian position on this issue should be analyzed, the factors motivating this position identified, and ways to optimize it explored, particularly through strengthening the partnership mechanisms that link the Kingdom to Russia.
The Western Sahara Issue: An Element of Russia’s Positioning on the International Stage
1. For Russia, the Western Sahara issue has always been part of the overall geopolitical game on the international stage. It has also been a lever for promoting the country’s interests with both Morocco and Algeria. Finally, it represents an element that allows Moscow to establish its influence in the region.
2. Although Russia has never been actively enterprising on this issue, it has nonetheless always made sure to maintain its influence on it.
3. Thus, an analysis of the chronological evolution of the Russian position reveals three stages: from 1975 to 1998, from 2000 to 2006, and from 2007 to the present.
FROM 1975 TO 1998: IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
4. Geopolitical considerations related to the Cold War largely shaped the position of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Western Sahara issue during the 1970s. At that time, it was simply an obvious rivalry between the Western and Eastern blocs.
The USSR unconditionally supported the countries within its ‘sphere of influence.’
Due to their socialist political choices, Algeria and Libya, in particular, belonged to this sphere. On the other hand, the USSR systematically opposed any American or Western initiative.
5. In this context, the Western Sahara issue was then seen as a ‘satellite conflict.’ Political support for Algeria’s position was clear. Military equipment and weapons were provided mainly through Gaddafi’s Libya, and training was provided by Cuba.
6. The support of the former USSR for the principle of self-determination in the Western Sahara issue, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, was a consequence of its role as leader of the movement for the emancipation of peoples oppressed by colonialism, and found a relay in Africa through Algiers.
However, the policy of moderation adopted by Morocco, and its permanent quest for balance in its foreign relations, led Moscow to tone down its positions on the Western Sahara, and avoid excessive protagonism at the expense of its relations with Morocco.
FROM 1998 TO 2006: SUPPORT FOR UN EFFORTS TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION
7. The fall of the Berlin Wall, combined with the break-up of the USSR and the failure of the socialist model, led to a weakening of Russia.
8. The Soviet ideological and military power was now a thing of the past. The bipolarity that characterized the world after the Second World War gave way to Western ideological, military, and economic supremacy led by the United States of America.
9. With its unfavorable economic realities exposed to the world, and faced with a fragile period of political and economic transition, Russia saw its influence diminish considerably within the United Nations and, in particular, in the Security Council, and limited itself almost exclusively to a few issues that it considered to be in its best interests.
10. In the United Nations General Assembly during this period, resolutions on the Western Sahara issue were always adopted without a vote, except for those in 2004 and 2006, which were put to a vote. On both occasions, Russia voted in favor of the two resolutions, while Morocco invited the UN member states to abstain from voting on the projects.
11. At the Security Council level, all resolutions were adopted by consensus, with the exception of resolutions 1282 (1999) and 1301 (2000), adopted respectively by 14 votes in favor (including Russia), 1 against (Namibia), and by 12 votes in favor (including Russia), 1 against (Namibia), and 2 abstentions (Jamaica and Mali). These two resolutions established the inapplicability of the settlement plan, due to the fundamental differences between the viewpoints of the parties.
12. On occasions, the Russian position had even been favorable to Morocco. Indeed, during the vote on Resolution 1541 in April 2004, Russia included the term ‘optimal solution based on an agreement between the two parties1’ to limit the primacy of the Baker Plan II, leaving the door open to other solutions.
13. Russia’s favorable vote on all resolutions adopted during this period illustrates, at least in appearance, its support for the efforts undertaken by the United Nations to reach a political, definitive, and mutually acceptable solution to the regional dispute over the Western Sahara.
FROM 2007 TO THE PRESENT: POSITIVE NEUTRALITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL NEGOTIATION PROCESS
14. Russia’s attitude during this period could be described as positive neutrality during the Security Council’s examination of the Western Sahara issue.
15. Thus, during the vote on Council Resolution 1813 (2008), Russia played a crucial role in maintaining and consolidating the parameters of the United Nations’ involvement, through MINURSO, in the regional dispute over the Western Sahara, by opposing the inclusion of any reference to the issue of human rights in the resolution, to such an extent that it was strongly criticized by the Representative of Costa Rica.
16. Indeed, the Representative of Costa Rica stated on April 30, 2008, that:
« Today, to our great surprise, the representative of the Russian Federation has threatened to exercise its technical veto on any mention of human rights, while the two parties are making mutual accusations about the issue of human rights, and while this issue was raised by several delegations during the consultations, and is mentioned numerous times in the reports of the Secretary-General. »
1 Reaffirms its support for the Peace Plan for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, which constitutes an optimal political solution based on an agreement between the two parties;
17. During the vote on Council Resolution 1871 (2009), the Russian Representative to the Council stated that ‘Russia’s position on the issue of Western Sahara remains unchanged. We support the search for a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable settlement of this issue, based on the resolutions of the Security Council and in accordance with the principle that the parties must consent to any proposed mechanism for settling this issue.’
18. During the Security Council’s examination of the Western Sahara issue in 2013, the Russian Representative stressed that his country encourages a mutually acceptable political solution based on the resolutions of the Security Council and respect for the UN Charter.
19. He added that Russia recognizes the difficulty of the negotiation, while emphasizing that there are no other options. Hence the need to seek a compromise. He insisted on compliance with the provisions of Chapter VI, under which the Western Sahara issue is handled.
20. It is unacceptable to try to impose solutions from abroad, however appealing they may seem.
21. During the Security Council’s examination of the Western Sahara issue in 2014, the Russian Representative noted that Russia’s position was unchanged, specifying that Moscow regretted that the situation had not progressed. He stated that his country rejects the status quo as well as any action that undermines the political solution.
22. He stated that Russia encourages a mutually acceptable political solution, based on the resolutions of the Security Council. He also indicated that MINURSO must respect its mandate and that it is unacceptable to politicize the issue of human rights.
23. Russia’s measured and constructive position was evident, in particular, during the vote on Council Resolution 1920 (2010), when opponents of Morocco’s territorial integrity were strongly pushing for an expansion of MINURSO’s mandate to include a ‘human rights’ component.
24. Thus, the Russian representative highlighted the following: ‘The Russian Federation participated in the drafting of this resolution and, as a result, became aware of the need to develop a Security Council decision that would guarantee progress in the negotiation process and that could prove useful for the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Christopher Ross, whose efforts we support.’
25. He specified that ‘the decision taken by the Security Council meets this need. The resolution strikes a good balance between the interests of the two parties and will allow them to preserve and, we hope, consolidate progress towards finding a just, lasting, and mutually beneficial solution to the problem of Western Sahara. We are convinced that this resolution meets the criteria of impartiality and objectivity and, to the greatest extent possible, takes into account the views of the parties.
We believe that the resolution adopted today will, with the support of the UN, facilitate progress in the process of settling the situation in Western Sahara.’
DETERMINING FACTORS OF THE RUSSIAN POSITION
26. If geopolitical considerations stemming from the Cold War largely shaped the Soviet and, later, Russian position during the first stage (1975-1998), they have not, however, completely disappeared during the two subsequent stages.
27. However, the Western Sahara issue has continued to interest Moscow for various reasons.
BALANCE BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA
28. The abandonment of the socialist model and the adoption of a market economy have pushed Russia to diversify its economic partners and trade outlets.
29. A rapprochement has taken place between Morocco and the Russian Federation, illustrated by the visit of His Majesty the King to Moscow in October 2002 and the signing of a declaration on the Strategic Partnership. President Putin also made an official visit to Morocco in September 2006. Relations have experienced quantitative and qualitative growth. Today, Morocco is Russia’s largest trading partner in Africa and the Arab world. And for good reason: the economic fabrics of the two countries are different and allow for complementarity with significant potential, and a trade balance largely favorable to Russia. This is less evident with its traditional partner, Algeria.
30. Indeed, while Moscow makes sure to maintain a balance in its relations with Rabat and Algiers, Russia and Algeria are rather competitors in their flagship product: hydrocarbons. Thus, with the exception of military equipment where Algeria remains a strategic client4 for Russia, bilateral commercial potential remains limited.
31. However, aware of the importance of the Western Sahara issue for both Morocco and Algeria, Moscow does not hesitate to derive economic benefit from both partners.
32. This situation supports the theory that a freeze on the Western Sahara dispute actually serves Russia’s interests.
THE UNITED NATIONS: A PREFERRED FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
33. With the loss of influence that the Soviet empire held throughout the world, Russia has only its right of veto and its permanent seat on the Security Council as the sole guarantors of a position in the world. This UN body allows it to protect its interests and oppose any threat.
2 In 2012, Russia was Morocco’s 6th largest supplier with over 20 billion dirhams and 19th largest customer with just 2 billion.
3 During a visit to Moscow by President Bouteflika on April 14, 2001, the countries signed a strategic partnership declaration.
4 Algeria is the second largest importer of Russian arms, with $1.9 billion in 2013.
34. Thus, Moscow insists that the Western Sahara issue be managed within the United Nations Security Council, and away from any mediation where it has everything to lose to other partners such as the United States, France, or the United Kingdom.
35. Furthermore, managing this issue within the Security Council allows Russia to have a physical presence on the ground through active participation within MINURSO.
36. This participation has been constant since 1993 in the form of military observers, whose numbers have always fluctuated between 17 and 25 people, making Russia one of the leading personnel contributors to MINURSO.
37. By insisting that the issue be dealt with under Chapter 6 and by conditioning any solution on the agreement of all parties5, Russia offers the Polisario and Algeria the possibility of indefinitely persisting in their obsolete position and maintaining the status quo.
38. While Russia’s rejection of the expansion of MINURSO’s mandate to include human rights gives the impression that it serves Morocco’s interests, it actually reinforces the Russian position which opposes the use of human rights for political purposes.
HOW TO OPTIMIZE THE RUSSIAN POSITION
39. To achieve this objective, Morocco must:
a. Renew, enrich, and diversify its strategic partnership with Russia, the aim being to create significant and structuring interests in all areas of cooperation (peace and security, economic relations and investments, armaments, etc.)
b. Involve Russia in actions in the Sahara, similar to what already exists in the fisheries sector. Oil exploration, phosphates, energy, and tourism development are, among others, sectors that could be involved in this regard;
c. Strengthen consultations with Moscow on issues concerning Africa and the Arab world; strengthen cooperation on spiritual security, which is a major challenge for Russia in the Caucasus.
40. In return, Russia could guarantee a freeze on the Western Sahara issue within the UN, giving the Kingdom time to take strong actions with irreversible facts regarding the Moroccanness of the Sahara.
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