When USA explains its decision to supply arms to Morocco

Tags : United States, Morocco, Western Sahara, Algeria, Polisario Front, Non Aligned Movement,

75. Memorandum of Conversation1

Algiers, November 1, 1979, 4:15–5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT : Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Algerian Foreign Minister Mohamed Benyahia (U)

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ulric Haynes, US Ambassador to Algeria
Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
James Rentschler, NSC Staff Member
Mr. Alec Toumayan, Interpreter
Mohamed Benyahia, Algerian Foreign Minister
Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry
Interpreter

In a discussion confined largely to the Middle East and the Western Saharan conflict Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, met for 1¾ hours with Algerian Foreign Minister Mohamed Benyahia. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski led off the discussion by noting that the President, by sending him to Algeria, wanted to outline the importance of our relations with Algeria; he had asked Dr. Brzezinski to explain to the Foreign Minister and President Bendjedid the basic points of United States foreign policy in the Middle East; and more specifically to outline the reasons underlying the President’s arms supply decision on Morocco. (C)

In developing these views, Dr. Brzezinski added that he wished to summarize very briefly a number of key ideas: First, the President and the United States Government accept the reality of fundamental change in the world. We live in a period marked by a major redistribution of political power, reflecting changes which in a sense started with the shots fired in 1945 at Setif.2 We have seen the end of the Eurocentric era, and while we accept this change, we insist that it be stable, constructive, and lead to conditions which are both peaceful and equitable. We are not interested in defending the status quo, but at the same time we will not permit other powers to exploit changes for their own ends. We view the non-aligned movement as a constructive element in world [Page 193]affairs and we especially appreciate the important role which Algeria plays in that context. (U)

Turning specifically to the Middle East, Dr. Brzezinski told the Foreign Minister that we expect neither Algerian approval nor support for our Middle East policy; we would, however, like Algeria to understand that policy. The President’s Administration, he noted, is the first Democratic Administration to work for peace in the Middle East on a basis other than maximalist Israeli positions. We are not supporting a separate Israeli-Egyptian agreement; rather we want to use the Israeli-Egyptian agreements as a catalyst leading to a larger settlement. We will try, in the next phase of negotiations, to move toward Palestinian autonomy. We hope to draw some moderate Palestinians directly into this process. We hope transitional arrangements will emerge which will, in time, modify both Israeli and Palestinian expectations, out of which will come eventual recognition of Israel’s right to exist. Our policy is based on the premise that Palestinians have the right to participate in the shaping of their own future. We expect this process to move forward, with the result that there will be both restoration of territories and self-government—for Arabs in general and for the Palestinians in particular. We recognize and respect the Arab renaissance and consider it in the United States interest to have friendly relations with as many Arab countries as possible. In this connection we want better relations with Iraq and Libya. (U)

Concerning Morocco, Dr. Brzezinski stressed that the arms decision we took was based on three things: first, the solution to the Western Saharan conflict should be political not military; second, we are not supporting Morocco in order to enable it to seek a military solution; rather we want to encourage Morocco, on the basis of stability and confidence, to seek a political settlement; third, we think it important that our friends know they can count on the United States and that the United States will not let military solutions be imposed upon them. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski added that we are not seeking to mediate this conflict—none of the parties have asked us to be a mediator and we are not volunteering—but we will be using whatever influence we have to urge others to join us in encouraging the parties to look for a political solution. The North African region has enormous potential; its resources are such that it could easily become a new Ruhr. We are confident that neither Algeria nor Morocco wants a war, and we are thus doing what we can to help promote a peaceful resolution of the conflict. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to note that we consider Algeria an important actor, both regionally and internationally. Algeria has high standing in the non-aligned movement and in the international community. Algeria’s struggle for independence confers prestige upon it, as does [Page 194]the role played by religion in Algerian national life and the fact that in international affairs Algeria speaks for itself. We are encouraged by our growing economic relations and believe that the time has come for more frequent contacts between our two countries in political affairs. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski concluded his presentation by noting that, while he didn’t expect our two governments to agree on everything, he didn’t think we have any fundamental conflicts. We both agree on the need to keep foreign military presence and ideological pressures out of Africa. We respect religious principles and the natural desire of people to participate in organizing their futures. We are both conscious of the gradual redistribution of political power taking place which will affect events until the end of this century and beyond. On all of these issues there is enough common ground to enable us to speak seriously to one another. (U)

In response, and before delivering his own presentation, Foreign Minister Benyahia asked why Dr. Brzezinski had not mentioned the words “PLO” or “Palestinian State” in his remarks concerning the Middle East. Dr. Brzezinski replied that he had wished to stress the basic tenets of our policy rather than specify solutions. (C)

Foreign Minister Benyahia went on to note that Algeria is very appreciative of the President’s gesture in sending Dr. Brzezinski to Algeria for the 25th Anniversary observance of the Algerian Revolution. Contacts between our two countries have not been frequent, which Algeria does not consider a good thing. So far as developing a dialogue is concerned, we are in agreement and we want this dialogue to be open and permanent. So far as international affairs are concerned, Foreign Minister Benyahia stressed that Algeria had acquired its independence through suffering and struggle. Accordingly, a fundamental basis of Algerian policy is its support for national independence. Algeria is excessively sensitive to the struggle of others for self-determination, and sometimes has gone against its own interest in asserting this principle (when Dr. Brzezinski asked for specific examples, Benyahia cited Algeria’s severance of relations with the US, UK, and the FRG over the Middle East—moves which hurt a developing country like Algeria from an economic point of view). (C)

Concerning the Palestinian question in the Middle East, Foreign Minister Benyahia said that Algeria saw this in the same way that it saw Rhodesia, Namibia and the former Portuguese African colonies. People must have the right to independence; the Palestinian people’s existence in negotiations can only be undertaken with those who represent and carry on alone the struggle of the people. History without exception shows that those are the only ones who validly express the people’s interest, a point which also applies to the Saharan conflict. [Page 195]The Foreign Minister said he did not want to employ adjectives that are too extreme, but the least he could say about our policy in the Middle East was that it was “unrealistic.” Any process which implicitly or explicitly aimed at eliminating the PLO will inevitably lead to a large-scale confrontation in the Middle East. (C)

Speaking at much greater length on the Western Saharan conflict, Foreign Minister Benyahia said he did not wish to get into a discussion which would question the friendship of one people against another people. However, if he were to rephrase Dr. Brzezinski’s position it would seem that the US is against the self-determination of people who are opposed by friends of the US. The basic facts of the Western Saharan situation are that Morocco, by force of arms, now occupies a territory previously held by the Spanish and that the people living there want their independence. These facts have led to a decolonization struggle. Either one is for self-determination, against it or neutral in this struggle. Each of these positions dictates certain actions. However, one thing is clear, you cannot claim neutrality while supplying one of the parties to the conflict the means of military repression. (C)

Developing further his points, the Foreign Minister wondered where Morocco really thought its borders were located and then alluded to the claims Morocco made as far as Timbuktu. Benyahia said he did not want to make a comparison with Israel, adding Morocco was one of the rare states in the world that wanted to have “elastic frontiers.” The Sahara conflict is one involving the right of a colonial people to self-determination, something that is not “negotiable.” The situation is not similar to that of the Algerian liberation struggle where the Algerians had something to negotiate over with the French; i.e., rights of French citizens remaining in Algeria and the commercial interests of French companies in Algeria. The difficulties that Morocco is having in the Sahara are not due to a lack of military equipment. They are due to a lack of moral justification. Additional arms to Morocco will not change the situation at all. In sum, said Benyahia, Algeria did not find American rationale for its supply policy convincing. Reinforcing Morocco to negotiate would mean negotiations at the expense of the Saharan people’s right of self-determination, a point which led Benyahia to comment on the question of bilateral relations. He stressed that Algeria was ready to discuss peace, but it continues to refuse two things: (1) the idea that the Western Saharan conflict could be considered a bilateral affair between Morocco and Algeria; (2) that Algeria can be the agent to discuss the future of the Saharan people with third parties. Since the existence of the first liberation movements, the USG has tended to attribute communist motives to them. Such an interpretation is worthy of “cartoons.” Our Charge in Washington reports that one of your staff told him that the USG knew of the existence of an accord [Page 196]between Libya and Algeria to use the Tuareg Tribesmen of Mali and Niger to destabilize their respective governments. This allegation prompted us to call on the governments of those two countries to see whether they believed such an allegation. Before making up its mind, the Foreign Minister urged the USG to contact the allegedly threatened governments. Algeria’s policy, he said, is not to meddle in the affairs of its neighbors; the only problem Algeria has with Morocco is based on that country’s policy of expansionism. (C)

On the subject of US-Algerian relations, Benyahia agreed with Dr. Brzezinski that since Algeria’s independence there have been no direct issues of disagreement between us. Economic ties have grown to such a state that the US is now Algeria’s number one economic partner, with France in third place. Algeria would like to expand those ties even more. At the same time, however, Algeria does not want the US to become a factor of destabilization in the region. Benyahia emphasized in this context that the American arms supply initiative causes Algeria enormous disquiet and concern. He likened US policy to the plight of a businessman who invests in a bankrupted business, since Algeria is convinced that arms to Morocco, no matter in what quantity, cannot bring stability, expecially for Morocco itself. The Foreign Minister said that for US-Algerian relations to remain excellent, the USG must not contribute to destabilization in the region. The USG is investing in a “rotten regime” in Morocco and, therefore, US arms will neither stabilize the region nor defeat the Polisario. Referring to the experience of recent history, the Foreign Minister pointed out that each time a power attempted to stop the process of self-determination, that power itself became destabilized. He cited, as examples, the cases of France with respect to Algeria and Portugal with respect to the decolonization of its African possessions. (C)

Benyahia stressed that the fall of King Hassan was not in Algeria’s interest; Algeria knows the King, but doesn’t know what might follow him. It could be even more expansionist. (C)

In conclusion, Foreign Minister Benyahia said he was in agreement with a need to develop our relations. He agreed too with Dr. Brzezinski’s points concerning a new economic order and the redistribution of political power. The more we discuss these problems, he said the better we will understand each other. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski thanked the Foreign Minister for a very enlightening and very impressive expose and expressed appreciation for the frankness with which it was delivered. He said that he felt it was fair to conclude that there were two issues which, while not central to our relations, were nevertheless important and on which we do not agree: the Palestinian question and Morocco. He wished to make a brief observation on each of these two issues. (C)

[Page 197]

On Palestine, Dr. Brzezinski questioned the Foreign Minister’s analogy between the PLO and Algeria’s own revolutionary experience. He agreed on the importance of recognizing the principal combatants; adding while it was true that the FLN was the principal combatant during Algeria’s independence struggle, the fact is that the principal combatants in the Middle East have not been the PLO but rather Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Dr. Brzezinski stressed that he did not ignore the importance of the PLO but he did not feel that its experience was comparable to that of the FLN. Indeed, Dr. Brzezinski noted, he has often said that if the PLO ever fought like the FLN, Israel would be in serious difficulty. (C)

A seond important difference between the PLO and the FLN, Dr. Brzezinski continued, is that in all the latter’s documents there was a readiness to sign a treaty with France provided France recognized Algerian rights. The PLO on the other hand does not accept an internationally acceptable platform for a Middle East framework of peace, embodied in UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. Dr. Brzezinski added that he made this observation not for polemical reasons but because unless certain distinctions were made clear, historic analogies can be seriously misleading. We do not exclude the role of the PLO—there is a process of change, and in this process there will be greater recognition of Palestinian rights. The resignation of Dayan and Abba Eban’s speech are indicators of that recognition within Israel itself.3 In response to the Foreign Minister’s contentions that we are pursuing an erroneous policy, Dr. Brzezinski said he felt obliged to point out that Arab policy in all the years past did not recover a single inch of Arab territory held by Israel. US policy is bringing that restoration about, and once the Sinai is restored, along with autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank, the stage will be set for further progress—and that is the reason why extremist elements in Israel oppose this because they see where it is leading. (C)

On Morocco, Dr. Brzezinski reemphasized that we are not assisting Morocco to impose its maximalist position. We are, however, worried by potential disruption in Morocco’s political life and the possible collapse of the King. The problem is that Morocco’s perception of the Western Sahara is completely different from Algeria’s. Morocco, and even Tunisia, say Algeria is the dynamic and expansionist power in the area. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to stress the need for dealing with subjective perceptions because they motivate people no matter how ridiculous [Page 198]the perceptions might seem to others. For our part, we will be using our leverage to promote a political solution. Some of our common friends will do the same. What we cannot permit is a situation to develop where one side gets massive outside assistance while the other becomes progressively isolated and forced to accept an imposed solution. It is this consideration which has led us to undertake talks with Morocco and others. We have no hidden motives. We are not trying by subterfuge to help Morocco prevail in a military sense. Finally, Dr. Brzezinski concluded, we don’t feel we have to choose between our friendship with Morocco and our growing relations and friendship with Algeria. Many of the things he has said, he added, the Foreign Minister will disagree with or reject. But so will the Moroccans. The important thing is to seek a political accommodation. (C)

The Foreign Minister pointed out that the Moroccan King speaks of the “right of hot pursuit” into Algeria. He felt it necessary to point out that if Morocco ever resorts to hot pursuit, then there will be a broader conflict. He continued by asking Dr. Brzezinski what the USG thinks of the Sahara resolution adopted at the OAU summit last July calling for a referendum in the Western Sahara to allow its inhabitants to express their desire to either be free or to be a part of Morocco.4 Algeria, he added, rigidly adheres to those principles of the OAU Charter calling for the respect of the rights of the people of the continent and for national borders. He chucklingly told Dr. Brzezinski that the latter was “insulting” Morocco when he said that the Polisario has enormous military might while Morocco has inadequate means. The Foreign Minister suggested that the USG send a State Department mission to visit the Polisario on the spot to see the amount of US arms seized intact from fleeing Moroccans. With time running out before Dr. Brzezinski’s next appointment with the Iranian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the Foreign Minister indicated that allegations of Tunisian fears of Algerian domination seemed to him incredible. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski took his leave in reemphasizing his belief that no fundamental conflicts divide the US and Algeria. He warmly thanked the Foreign Minister for his helpful views; the latter responded in kind and said he was making arrangements to insure that Dr. Brzezinski would meet with President Bendjedid the following day. (U)

Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 9–12/79. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Hotel Aurassi.↩

On May 8, 1945, French police fired on Algerians protesting colonial rule in the town of Sétif.↩

Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan resigned on October 21 over differences with Menachem Begin regarding Palestinian autonomy and the West Bank. Abba Eban’s speech is not further identified.↩

See footnote 4, Document 45.↩

Source : State Department

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