Introduction
Morocco and the UN, backed by the US, are engaged in a sort of permanent squabble over the former Spanish colony. Rabat blames the UN Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, even though in a meeting with Moroccan authorities he confessed that he supported the autonomy proposed by Morocco as a solution to the conflict. But for them, Ross tells each side what they want to hear.
Despite advocating a solution that coincides, broadly speaking, with the proposal of the Moroccan authorities, they abhor Ban Ki-moon’s personal envoy. Why this animosity? « Ross has demonstrated his partiality and his fundamentally hostile attitude to Morocco, » reads another note from Moroccan diplomacy drafted earlier this year. In another cable, Rabat also underlines his « flagrant contradictions ». It reproaches him for « exempting Algeria » from any responsibility, « making proposals that go beyond his mandate », « marginalizing the autonomy initiative » for the Sahara and « trying to involve the African Union » in the dispute.
Therefore, « without entering into an open confrontation with him, he must be discredited, » the first note advocates. « Without turning him into a victim, he must be forced to resign from his mission (…) ». To do this, « his visits to Morocco must be reduced to a minimum (…) ». Among journalists, academics and parliamentarians, « a skeptical message » about him must be « dropped (…) ». « Is he the man for the job? » is one of the questions that should be repeated to discredit him.
The message has not quite sunk in. Hence, a note delivered on October 2 to the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Salahedine Mezzouar, outlines another hypothesis: « to assess the situation as a whole and calculate the political price (…) of the possibility, for our country, of rejecting the personal envoy » of Ban Ki-moon. This would mean confronting the UN Secretary-General and the US State Department, with whom Rabat already has strained relations.
But what has Ross done to displease the Moroccan authorities? The answer also emerges in the cables. On April 9, 2013, the personal envoy pointed out, for example, in Rabat to the then Moroccan Foreign Minister, Saadeddin Othmani, that during his visit to El Aaiún, the capital of the Sahara, « there were peaceful demonstrations » but « the demonstrators were beaten by civilian agents », « Morocco should be interested in demonstrating that life under Moroccan sovereignty is peaceful, » he concluded. The comment was upsetting.
Even worse in Rabat’s eyes. Ross was received in Geneva, in July 2013, by Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. He expressed his « disappointment » that the US had withdrawn its proposal, in April of that year, to extend the mandate of MINURSO (United Nations contingent deployed in the Sahara) so that it would have competences in the area of human rights. It is « a setback for the cause of human rights, » the envoy stressed.
He then asked Pillay to make a visit to the Sahara and to « formulate and endorse a recommendation for the inclusion of human rights in the MINURSO mandate ». The conversation between the two was related to the then Moroccan ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Omar Hilale, by one of his sources in the High Commission.
In April 2013, the then US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, proposed to extend the mandate of the blue helmets in the former Spanish colony so that among their attributions would be the monitoring of respect for human rights in the Sahara and in the refugee camps of Tindouf (south-west of Algeria). Rice first submitted this proposal to the so-called Group of Friends of Western Sahara and France was then the first to reject it at the request of Morocco. Spain and Russia seconded France.
To overcome this situation, the Moroccan authorities are proposing a plan summarised in the following note:
Elements of s strategy for managing the April 2014-April 2015 period concerning the issue of the Moroccan Sahara
Introduction
The UN year April 2014 – April 2015 promises to be a pivotal stage in the management of the Moroccan Sahara issue by the United Nations. The perspectives outlined in the Secretary-General’s report of April 10, 2014 (S/2014/258), the unprecedented mobilization of the African Union (AU), and the pressures from certain key powers require great vigilance and the implementation of a comprehensive strategy. This strategy should include, among other things, strong actions internally, a diversification of support at the UN Security Council level (Russia and China), and rigorous management regarding relations with the UN (Secretariat, MINURSO, Personal Envoy, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General).
In accordance with the letter and spirit of the letter addressed by His Majesty the King, May God Assist Him, to the UN Secretary-General, the purpose of this note is to develop this latter aspect (management of relations with the UN) by reviewing the following five themes: 1) Reframing the work of the Personal Envoy; 2) Managing the appointment process of the new SRSG; 3) Rigorous management of relations with MINURSO; 4) Interruption of the functions of the two AU observers to MINURSO; and 5) Implementation of a clear policy regarding visits by foreign delegations to the southern provinces.
1) Reframing the work of the Personal Envoy (PE):
Mr. ROSS has demonstrated blatant bias and a fundamentally hostile attitude towards Morocco. Without entering into an open confrontation with him, the aim is to discredit him. Without making him a victim, the aim is to force him to renounce his mission, and without being openly against his approach, the aim is to refuse to be complicit in a pre-established scenario (the failure of the 2007 process), particularly through the following measures:
-Limit his travels to Morocco as much as possible and confine contacts with him to the New York level;
-In case of travel to Morocco, have him received at an intermediate level (working level);
-Disseminate, through unofficial channels (journalists, academics, parliamentarians, etc.), a skeptical message regarding the PE (Is he the right person for the job? Can the political process be renewed with the same PE? etc.);
-React firmly and promptly to any misconduct on the part of the PE.
-Put pressure on him to confirm, in advance, Algeria’s willingness to commit strongly and sincerely to a compromise.
2) Managing the appointment process of the new SRSG
The Secretary-General is preparing to appoint a new SRSG, replacing the current one (Germany), whose mandate expires in July 2014. The appointment process is currently in its final stage; the SG is expected to choose from three candidates. While the appointment is the exclusive responsibility of the SG, the success of the SRSG’s mission is not conceivable without the cooperation of Morocco. Therefore, the following measures should be considered:
Act proactively and preventively regarding the appointment of the SRSG. This involves instructing the Moroccan Ambassador to the UN to approach the Secretariat to, on the one hand, communicate Morocco’s wish to be consulted/informed as a last resort on the SG’s final choice and, on the other hand, to gather information regarding the profiles of the candidates for the SRSG position.
Issue a formal reaction as soon as the SRSG is appointed, through an official letter, which acknowledges the SG’s choice. The letter would recall the SRSG’s framework and emphasize that any deviation on the part of the latter would compromise his mission and end Morocco’s cooperation.
3) Rigorous management of relations with MINURSO
A number of restrictive measures can be imposed on MINURSO and its members without violating the SOFA. These include the following measures:
Reclaiming the premises made available to MINURSO by the municipality, as well as the premises granted free of charge to MINURSO for the storage of its equipment.
Revising the favorable rates applied to MINURSO for water and electricity services.
Suspending the decision of the Moroccan authorities on the granting of new license plates.
Imposing restrictions on exemptions and franchises for the import of goods intended for use and resale in MINURSO commissaries, as well as for the import of personal effects and equipment for official use.
Limiting the movement of MINURSO members outside the mission area.
Limiting the issuance of visas for MINURSO military and civilian personnel. The opinion of the MFAEC must be requested in advance.
Establishing restrictions on MINURSO’s interaction with officials of the Moroccan authorities.
Restrictive interpretation of Military Agreement No. 1.
Requiring that the same ceasefire monitoring measures be applied identically to the East and West of the defense system (Night surveillance; escort of MINURSO patrols).
Advising MINURSO that any openness to the Polisario’s intention to stamp the passports of MINURSO members would trigger a radical reaction from Morocco.
Suspend discussions between the FAR and Minurso regarding a possible revision of Military Agreement No. 1.
4) Interruption of the functions of the two AU observers to MINURSO
In response to the activism of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and in the context of the latest report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Sahara, it is proposed to terminate the functions of the two African Union (AU) Observers to MINURSO.
This decision would constitute a strong message to the African Union and a firm reaction to its inconsiderate activism against the higher interests of Morocco. The decision would not be directed against the UN, since the AU observers are not part of MINURSO. It would be likely to have a positive impact on Moroccan public opinion, following the telephone conversation between His Majesty the King and the UN SG on April 12, 2014. Finally, on a practical level, it would deprive the AU of a source of information on the ground.
On the other hand, the expulsion of the AU Observers could provoke negative reactions that Morocco would have to manage, particularly from the AU and its members hostile to Morocco. Similarly, the UN – and particularly the Secretary-General – could take a position on this issue, insisting on the importance of cooperation between the UN and the AU.
In view of the foregoing, the following steps are proposed:
Implement the decision quickly, preferably after the adoption of the Security Council resolution on the Sahara. This involves convening the AU Observer currently present in Morocco, through the Coordination Office with MINURSO, to inform him of Morocco’s decision.
Inform the SRSG and the SG simultaneously, just a few hours before the decision is implemented.
Inform a few influential members of the Security Council, ensuring that the decision will not impact the work of MINURSO.
Launch an explanation and information campaign towards certain friendly African countries.
Avoid any direct official communication likely to create negative reactions.
5) Implementation of a clear policy regarding visits by foreign delegations to the southern provinces.
Morocco must equip itself with a clear doctrine on this issue. This doctrine must reconcile, on the one hand, the importance of demonstrating the openness of the territory and the normality of life in the Moroccan Sahara region and, on the other hand, the necessary firmness towards activists hostile to Morocco, who travel clandestinely to the Sahara at specific times and with well-known agendas. In this regard, it is necessary, in particular, to:
Encourage visits from political delegations (government officials, parliamentarians, local authorities, political party leaders, etc.), journalists, academics and NGOs, who are not aligned with adverse theses.
Establish a list of hostile actors and inform their countries and organizations in advance.
The aim is to demonstrate that the territory is not closed to visits by foreign delegations, but that people whose hostility and bias are known are not welcome in Morocco.
Impose mandatory passage through national institutions (Parliament, CNDH).
SOURCE :
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