Tags : Morocco, Algeria, Hassan II, Mohammed VI, Western Sahara, strategic cooperation between Morocco and US,

Key Judgments

Information available as of 20 February 1984 was used in this report.

Morocco and the United States: Strategic Cooperation After Three Years

In our view, Moroccan-US relations are good, but somewhat fragile. After nearly a decade of cool relations in the 1970s, Morocco and the United States have increased cooperation in military, economic, and political affairs. We believe, however, that many Moroccans expect the US relationship to solve the difficult problems facing Morocco. Despite close ties, therefore, there is the danger that Rabat will reassess relations with Washington if there is no improvement in Morocco’s economic and military condition.

US-Moroccan strategic cooperation contributes directly to the dominance of US forces in the Mediterranean basin. The centerpiece of the new strategic ties is the six-year agreement signed in 1982 allowing the United States emergency access to Moroccan military facilities. Underpinning the formal aspects of strategic cooperation are the shared views between King Hassan and US leaders on key global and regional problems that have resulted in Rabat providing substantial support for Washington on a broad range of issues.

Several factors could seriously disrupt US-Moroccan relations. The most pressing is the prevailing economic malaise in Morocco, the resulting strains in Moroccan society, and the expectation among many Moroccans that the United States can restore their once bright economic prospects. In our view, Moroccans—from the King to the average citizen—hold unrealistic expectations of the benefits Morocco will enjoy from closer ties with Washington:

-Military officers expect to defeat the Polisario insurgency in Western Sahara.

-The average worker anticipates trade, investment, and employment.

-King Hassan probably expects to prevent any threat to the monarchy that the current economic crisis—the worst since independence—might trigger.

-Even if Rabat deftly manages its austerity program, there is a strong possibility for disillusionment with the United States. Under the worst circumstances, economic grievances fueled by Islamic fundamentalists and other generally anti-US, anti-Western elements might spiral into civil disorder that would curtail US-Moroccan cooperation.

-Less dire challenges to US-Moroccan cooperation stem from differing strategic interests. Despite King Hassan’s generally pro-Western outlook, Rabat’s views do not always coincide with Washington’s and could lead to misunderstandings of the sort that dampened friendships in the 1970s. These differences include:

-Morocco’s perception of Algeria as its primary strategic threat and its limited tolerance for warming US-Algerian relations.

-Rabat’s perception of Libya as a regional threat, its policy of limiting Libya’s troublemaking through accommodation, and its muted but determined disapproval of Washington’s confrontational approach to Tripoli.

-Morocco’s reluctance to step too far in front of a moderate Arab consensus on Arab-Israeli issues and thus its unwillingness to support openly some of the bolder US-sponsored peace initiatives.

Political and economic ties between the United States and Morocco have a long history. Moroccans frequently note that Morocco was one of the first countries to recognize the United States, and, with the Treaty of Marrakech in 1787, it established commercial relations with the United States. In more recent times, the US Air Force maintained Strategic Air Command bases in Morocco until 1963, and the US Navy operated communications facilities there until 1978. The US Consul in Casablanca reports that many Moroccans identify with the United States as a free, tolerant, and powerful country, untainted by colonial exploitation in northwest Africa.

Balancing the long history of cordial US-Moroccan relations is the pervasive French influence in Morocco, the result of the French protectorate over Morocco from 1912 until 1956. In culture, commerce, education, and economic and military assistance, Paris plays the leading foreign role in Morocco, and it is likely to remain paramount in the future. Nonetheless, Moroccans at times consider the French role to be paternalistic and a vestige of colonialism, and, when displeased with French policy, Rabat looks to the United States as an alternative source of support.

In the late 1970s, there was friction in US-Moroccan relations in part because King Hassan believed that Washington was not shouldering its responsibilities as a great power. The establishment of a Soviet-backed Cuban military presence in the Horn of Africa and the fall of the Shah of Iran—whom Hassan urged the United States to support during the revolution—led the King to doubt the efficacy and reliability of US friendship. These doubts were compounded by Washington’s restrictions on the use of US-supplied military equipment in the Western Sahara insurgency and by its growing concerns over human rights in Morocco.

Relations between Washington and Rabat began to mend in 1980 when the United States sold F-5 and OV-10 aircraft to Morocco. In 1981, according to the US Embassy in Rabat, warm expressions of friendship from US officials especially pleased the Moroccan leaders. At the same time, Washington’s decision to lift the restrictions on the use of US-supplied materiel in Western Sahara further improved ties between the two countries. In our view, Washington’s renewed emphasis on strategic concerns—such as countering Cuban military activity in Angola—struck a responsive chord with King Hassan, adding to the warmth between Morocco and the United States. In the past three years, Washington and Rabat have forged a strategic partnership involving cooperation on military, economic, and political issues.

US Interests

Traditional US interests in Morocco are, in large measure, a product of Morocco’s strategic location. Occupying the northwest corner of Africa, Morocco dominates the western approaches to the Mediterranean and affords US naval craft—including nuclear-powered warships—access to ports on both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. In a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a friendly Morocco would constitute a reserve area close to Europe and accessible to the Atlantic.

For much the same reason, the United States has benefited from Rabat’s refusal to grant the Soviet Union access to Moroccan facilities. Under hostile influence, Morocco would pose a serious threat to NATO’s southwestern flank—particularly Spain and Portugal—and would threaten maritime communications with the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. In the view of the US Embassy in Morocco, Rabat’s continued denial of sea and air facilities to the Soviet Union contributes directly to the dominance of US forces in the Mediterranean basin.

Strategic cooperation has become the centerpiece of US-Moroccan relations. In May 1982, Washington and Rabat signed a six-year transit and access agreement, which gives the United States access to Moroccan airfields to support force deployments in unspecified contingencies, subject to Moroccan approval. In addition, a joint military commission was formed to manage the various facets of US-Moroccan security affairs, including joint exercises, training, intelligence, mapping exchange, and US security assistance. To help strengthen Rabat’s defense capabilities, the United States also has provided substantial military aid, which in fiscal year (FY) 1984 is to amount to 21.7 million in foreign military sales (FMS) credits and 30 million in military assistance grants.

US economic interests in Morocco are not as important as its strategic interests. Morocco controls significant economic assets, however, that may become increasingly important to the West. It possesses 70 percent of proven global reserves of phosphate rock, of which Morocco is the world’s leading exporter. Currently, the United States is Morocco’s main competitor in the phosphate trade, but, as US exports decline, Morocco is expected to dominate the market by the mid-1990s. In addition, these deposits could become an important source of byproduct uranium, which Morocco plans to begin extracting by the mid-1980s, although commercial production may be somewhat further off.

Significant oil shale reserves—fourth largest in the world—are in Morocco. At current prices, recovery of petroleum from these deposits is not economic, but, as more easily exploitable oilfields are exhausted near the turn of the century, Moroccan oil shale should prove increasingly valuable—particularly to Western Europe.

The View from Morocco

Washington and Rabat both view strategic cooperation as serving their interests, but their definitions of those interests do not always coincide. In our judgment, Rabat’s immediate strategic concerns are Algeria—its chief rival for primacy in the Maghreb—and the anti-Moroccan insurgency in Western Sahara. We believe Moroccan officials—particularly in the military—judge the worth of US-Moroccan strategic ties according to their usefulness to Rabat’s efforts to counter these regional threats. In our view, Moroccan officials are likely to be disappointed when competing US global interests or emerging regional interests, such as economic relations with Algeria, prevent Washington from fully satisfying Moroccan desires for political, military, and economic support. This disappointment eventually could cause Rabat to question the value of strategic cooperation and lead to cooler US-Moroccan relations such as occurred in the late 1970s.

The potential for misunderstanding is compounded by an inflated Moroccan perception of US capabilities and of Rabat’s importance to Washington.

December 1983 Hassan regarded the US aid package to Tunisia—roughly equal to Morocco’s—with surprise, and, we believe, displeasure. Moreover, the US defense attache in Rabat and US Consul in Casablanca both report that many Moroccans anticipate the reestablishment of permanent US military bases, such as the old Strategic Air Command bases of the 1950s.

Moroccan perceptions of the military relationship with the United States are perhaps most unrealistic in regard to Western Sahara. Reporting from the US Consul in Casablanca indicates a widespread perception that strategic cooperation with the United States will enable Rabat to defeat the Polisario guerrillas in the Sahara.

Most Air Force officers believe that the Sahara war can only be settled militarily and that the Polisario is backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, which thus calls for US support of the Moroccan war effort.

Despite increased US military aid, however, we do not expect Morocco to defeat the Polisario. Rabat, therefore, may blame Washington for not providing sufficient aid to break the stalemate.

Economic Cooperation: Great Expectations

Strategic cooperation between Rabat and Washington is complemented by US programs to address Morocco’s pressing economic problems. In 1981-82 total US economic assistance to Morocco—loans and grants -more than doubled compared with 1979-80. In FY 1984 the United States will provide 209 million in agricultural credits and an additional 36 million in PL-480 aid-enough to finance over half of Morocco’s annual wheat imports.

There have also been efforts to stimulate US trade and investment in Morocco. In January 1982 the US Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce led a trade and investment mission to Morocco. At the same time, a US-Morocco Joint Committee on Economic Relations was established. The kingdom also was host to several other US trade missions and sponsored a fisheries colloquium. Despite these efforts, the US Embassy reports that US exports to Morocco continue to outweigh US imports by nearly 10 to 1.  

While US programs ease the burden of Moroccan poverty, they cannot solve Rabat’s severe economic difficulties. According to the US Embassy in Rabat, Morocco faces the most serious economic and finan- cial crisis since independence:  

• The 1983 current account deficit hit $1.8 billion as prices for phosphate, Morocco’s main export, re- mained severely depressed. The 1984 current account deficit is likely to reach $1.6 billion as phosphate prices have not recovered, and the country continues to be buffeted by drought.

• Foreign debt at the end of 1983 totaled $11 billion, with the debt service ratio reaching 45 percent. Consular and defense attache reports indicate that the King’s expectations of greater US economic assist- ance are shared by the Moroccan public. The US Consul in Casablanca notes that many Moroccans, remembering the old US airbases, expect the transit agreement to yield an influx of US servicemen and new jobs for the local populace. The business commu- nity hopes closer US-Moroccan ties will increase US trade and investment in Morocco. Moroccan expectations of the immediate economic benefits of closer relations with the United States seem to be exaggerated. The US Embassy in Rabat estimates it will take the kingdom at least three to five years to return to economic soundness. Meanwhile, domestic austerity may disillusion those Moroccans who expect prosperity to flow from an American spigot. The access agreement, we believe, will produce few Moroccan jobs; and a strong dollar, geography, and language and cultural barriers will continue to militate against a rapid rise in US-Moroccan business.

Political Cooperation: Common Concerns

Shared political interests and views have fortified bilateral relations. The US Embassy in Rabat believes King Hassan’s views, which generally parallel those of Washington, have produced policies that assist US objectives and oppose Soviet aims and those of regional radical states hostile to the United States. In the past few years, Morocco’s friendship has been especially helpful in managing Arab and African problems:

Middle East. Hassan generally has been a voice of moderation in Middle Eastern issues and has indicated a willingness to support a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. The King has maintained quiet, unofficial contact with the Israelis and was instrumental in arranging Egyptian President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977. According to the US Embassy in Rabat, in January 1983 Hassan urged other Arabs to support the Reagan Middle East peace plan. Nonetheless, Hassan is constrained by Arab—particularly Saudi—sensibilities and has been unwilling to publicly support the Camp David accords or to restore full diplomatic relations with Cairo.

Arab and Islamic Issues. Despite his public opposition to Camp David, the King has supported the reintegration of Egypt into the Arab world, and in February he met with Egyptian President Mubarak. In January 1984, as chairman of the Islamic Conference held in Casablanca, Hassan was instrumental in that organization’s decision to invite Egypt to resume its seat. As always, though, Hassan’s support is tempered by his need to respect the Arab consensus, and he did not prevent the summit’s passage of a number of anti-US resolutions.

Sub-Saharan Africa. King Hassan generally supports the status quo in Africa and opposes radical regimes. In the late 1970s he twice sent troops—after considerable US urging and promises of logistic support—to quell a rebellion in Zaire’s Shaba province. In 1981 a senior Moroccan official told the US Consul in Tangier that he agreed with Washington’s insistence that the Cuban withdrawal from Angola be linked to an overall peace settlement in Namibia. More recently, however, the King’s preoccupation with Western Sahara and domestic troubles has caused him to take a less active role, outside of diplomatic efforts in the Organization of African Unity on matters related to Western Sahara.

International Forums. In the United Nations and the Nonaligned Movement, Hassan has advocated US views. In 1982 Morocco led all 101 nonaligned states in support for US positions in the UN General Assembly, according to the US Embassy in Rabat. The Embassy expects the figures for 1983 to be similar. In October 1983 King Hassan issued a public statement of support for the US invasion of Grenada, one of a very few heads of state to do so.

We believe Hassan’s main goal in cooperating with the United States is to capitalize on US strategic concerns in order to secure a long-term US presence in the region and a US commitment to protect the monarchy. Accordingly, if Hassan perceives the United States to be less generous in its support, friction may develop between Rabat and Washington. For example, following the reprogramming of $52 million in Moroccan FMS funds for El Salvador, Hassan canceled Moroccan participation in the July 1983 “Bright Star” exercises and refused landing rights to US aircraft involved in the maneuvers.

In addition, Morocco’s foreign relations are heavily conditioned by the Saharan conflict. In our view, the King could follow policies inimical to US interests if they serve his objectives in the region. Rabat’s rapprochement with Libya last summer was driven largely by Hassan’s desire to cut off Tripoli’s aid to the Polisario. In return, Hassan did not oppose the Libyan drive into Chad, and he has disapproved of Washington’s confrontational approach to Tripoli.

The Effect of Domestic Uncertainty

In December 1983, the US Embassy in Rabat reported Morocco’s preoccupation with domestic problems. As these problems loom larger in Rabat, King Hassan may find it increasingly difficult to maintain highly visible ties with the United States.

According to the US Embassy, the economy is the central domestic concern in Morocco today. This problem became especially acute in January when planned reductions in food subsidies led to riots in a number of Moroccan cities, which had to be put down by Army regulars. The US Embassy reports that discontent will continue in a period of prolonged austerity, and US officials who toured the riot areas noted increased local resentment toward the authorities. Although the January riots do not herald an imminent popular revolt, we expect austerity may provoke further civil disorder over the next year. If there is more violence, popular resentment probably would deepen, focus on the monarchy, and perhaps, turn against the United States.

There is little evidence, however, that domestic discontent has led to resentment of US-Moroccan ties. The US Consulates in both Tangier and Casablanca have reported a generally positive public reaction to US naval visits to those ports and to other aspects of close relations with the United States. There are, however, indications of a nascent opposition to closer US-Moroccan cooperation:

The US Consul in Casablanca reports that this opposition is mostly underground and is strongest among students, intellectuals, and leftists. He reports that some younger Moroccans sarcastically compare the transit agreements to conditions under the old French protectorate.

Foreign Minister Boucetta faced “major problems” from his party’s left wing over his support for the access agreement.

Some sectors of the military—primarily the pro-French infantry officers—may oppose closer strategic ties with the United States.

Islamic fundamentalists, divided into small, competing groups, also are likely to oppose closer cooperation with any Western power, in our judgment.

We believe the strains resulting from the economic malaise and the possibility of protest from opposition groups may lead Moroccan officials to reassess relations with Washington.

A number of Moroccan politicians feared that once the United States achieved its strategic objectives in Morocco, US support for the kingdom would dwindle. The US Consul in Casablanca has reported similar doubts among some middle- and lower-level officials, although in 1982 optimism about relations with the United States was predominant.

Impact on Other States

The growth of US-Moroccan strategic cooperation has complicated US relations with other states in the Western Mediterranean. In particular, Algeria, France, and Spain have exhibited concern over the US-Moroccan military relationship. These countries appear satisfied that US-Moroccan cooperation does not jeopardize their interests, but the potential for friction over this issue remains.

Algeria. Algiers—which under President Bendjedid has gradually improved ties with the United States—was at first alarmed by Rabat’s grant of transit facilities to the United States. Following a policy of strict nonalignment, Algeria opposed what it considered excessive superpower meddling in the Maghreb. Algiers was particularly concerned that the agreement might presage the establishment of US bases and greater US involvement in the Sahara war, which Algiers hopes to insulate from the East-West rivalry. We believe that US explanation of the agreement has assuaged Algerian worries. Nonetheless, should Algeria perceive US-Moroccan strategic cooperation to be leading to a permanent superpower presence in the region, US relations with Algeria probably would suffer.

France. Since the end of the French protectorate in 1956, Paris has retained considerable political, military, economic, and cultural influence in Morocco. France is Morocco’s largest commercial partner and a significant donor of economic and military aid. The movement toward closer US-Moroccan cooperation in these areas coincided with a downturn in French relations with the kingdom over Moroccan loan arrearages and the election of the socialist Mitterrand government, which we believe the conservative Hassan initially distrusted. Paris, jealous of preserving its influence, feared the United States would replace France as Rabat’s main patron, according to the US Embassy in Paris.

We believe French and US interests in northwest Africa are essentially congruent, and a greater US presence in Morocco is unlikely to threaten the dominant French position. Meanwhile, US Consular reporting and press reports suggest that Rabat has overcome its initial suspicions of Mitterrand. King Hassan, however, is not above turning to the United States to obtain concessions from the French.

In 1982, Hassan was angered by his perception that Paris was pressing him to refrain from closer ties with Washington. The King intended to press France in return. The Mitterrand government’s fear—reflected in the French press and voiced by the French Ambassador to Rabat—that increased US military activity in Morocco will provoke a greater Soviet presence in the Western Mediterranean may also lead Paris to try to contain US influence in the kingdom.

Spain. According to the US Embassy in Madrid, any growing US involvement—especially military cooperation—with Morocco unavoidably arouses Spanish sensitivities. Spain holds two small enclaves—Ceuta and Melilla—and several islands along the northern Moroccan coast, which Rabat also claims. Any US exercises with Morocco, particularly near the enclaves, harms US-Spanish relations. As with France, US and Spanish interests in the Maghreb are generally parallel. Still, we believe the potential remains for Moroccan-Spanish disputes, possibly incidents, over the enclaves, which would force the United States to support both parties to the dispute.

Outlook

After three years of growing cooperation, US-Moroccan ties are good but somewhat fragile. The US defense attache in Rabat reports that a senior Moroccan military officer stated that relations between Rabat and Washington were the best he had seen in 25 years, but that they were still « thin » and especially dependent on good personal relations between the President and King Hassan.

In our view, however, Rabat may temper US-Moroccan friendship as initial optimism and exaggerated Moroccan expectations yield to the difficult economic, military, and social problems facing Morocco. We do not expect a more sober Moroccan outlook to threaten the US strategic relationship, but Hassan is likely to minimize the more public aspects of US ties, such as ship visits and joint exercises.

We believe unrealistic Moroccan expectations could result in bitter disillusionment with the US strategic relationship if Washington appears insensitive to Moroccan needs. Precipitate aid cuts, major Polisario battlefield victories, or increasing domestic austerity, we believe, could lead to Rabat’s disenchantment with Washington. In such a case, we would expect Rabat to be much less sympathetic in political and military matters and to turn to France and Saudi Arabia for military and economic support.

Potential Challenges in US-Moroccan Relations

We foresee a number of abrasive features in the strategic partnership between Morocco and the United States. Although manageable, the following issues could hinder close relations between Rabat and Washington:

Sovereignty Concerns: Despite Rabat’s control over US use of Moroccan facilities, the granting of military rights to Western powers remains an emotional issue in the kingdom, which still remembers its subjection to French protection. The transit facilities could become a focal point for Moroccans angry with US policy or a symbol useful to opponents of the monarchy, such as radical Muslims and leftists.

US-Israeli Ties: King Hassan found the announcement of US-Israeli strategic cooperation awkward for his government and other moderate Arab regimes. For example, in December 1983, young socialist militants in Casablanca, angry over US airstrikes in Lebanon, boycotted a regional meeting of the Socialist Party to protest the party leader’s meeting with Secretary of State Shultz. An outbreak of fighting between Israel and Syria or between the United States and an Arab country could damage Washington’s relations with Rabat.

Western Sahara Conflict: Although the continued Moroccan war effort in the Sahara conflicts with the US objective of stability in the Maghreb, most Moroccans believe the United States should support them. Unrealistic Moroccan expectations of US support for a military victory in the Sahara could eventually threaten US-Moroccan strategic cooperation.

Economic Woes: Deteriorating economic and social conditions are expected to continue fueling unrest among Morocco’s poor and eroding middle-class confidence in the monarchy. While anti-American themes were not prominent in the Casablanca riots of 1981 or the January 1984 disturbances, the US association with the King could lead opponents to inject anti-US protests into future unrest.

Domestic Stability and Foreign Policy

Morocco’s security forces remain loyal to the monarchy and can likely maintain order in the near term. However, continued domestic unrest could diminish Hassan’s support and limit his foreign policy flexibility. In such a scenario, Hassan would likely reduce visible aspects of strategic cooperation, such as joint military exercises.

The Succession Issue

We believe the King will remain on the throne for the near future. We do not anticipate the overthrow of the monarchy as a result of popular revolution. All the same, worsening economic conditions and foreign pressures—such as the Sahara war—could cause opposition groups to coalesce and exploit public discontent in a challenge to the government. This worst-case scenario could deal a severe blow to US relations with Morocco. We believe a revolutionary successor regime would probably abrogate the transit and access agreement and cancel other US-Moroccan military cooperation programs. Strong nationalist and Islamic sentiments, however, would probably preclude a sudden turn to the Soviet Union.

Potential Scenarios for Succession

1. Assassination or Sudden Illness

More likely than a revolution is the possibility that King Hassan might fall victim to a sudden fatal illness or assassination. In this case:
We would not expect a major shift in Moroccan policy toward the United States.

Domestic politics would be unsettled for some time.

Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed, aged 20, would succeed his father according to the constitution.

2. Challenges Under a New Monarch

There are doubts about Sidi Mohamed’s ability to rule effectively.

A government under the young prince would likely lack the prestige and authority of his father.
Senior military officers would probably remain loyal to the throne unless Sidi Mohamed proved weak, in which case the Army might seek a greater role in government.

3. Military-Influenced Government

A military or military-dominated regime would likely reflect the pro-Western views of the officer corps.
Such a regime could be expected to look to the United States for assistance.

Source : CIA Archives

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