Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, MINURSO, Polisario Front, UN, Alexander Ivanko, Staffan de Mistura, Security Council,

In April, Security Council members are expected to receive a briefing in closed consultations on the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO, Alexander Ivanko, and the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, Staffan de Mistura, are the anticipated briefers.

Key Recent Developments

The Secretary-General’s latest report on MINURSO, published on 1 October 2024 and covering developments from the previous year, highlighted improvements in the mission’s observation efforts, attributing these to better access to areas near the berm and more timely security assurances for its movement to sites of alleged firing incidents and aerial strikes. (The berm, an approximately 1,700-mile-long earthen wall, separates the Moroccan-administered part of Western Sahara from territory controlled by the Polisario Front—the entity representing the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara.) The report noted, however, that west of the berm (that is, the area controlled by Morocco), security and safety concerns sometimes hindered the mission’s operational and observation activities in areas with frequent firing incidents. Moreover, the mission’s lack of access to local interlocutors in this region continued to severely limit its ability to collect reliable situational awareness, assess developments, and provide comprehensive reporting across its area of responsibility.

The report highlighted significant progress in addressing logistical supply constraints on the east side of the berm. The mission’s deployment in this area, however, remained subject to prior authorisation from Polisario on a “provisional and exceptional” basis. For the first time since 2020, MINURSO team site commanders held liaison meetings with the Polisario Front’s deputy military regional commanders at their respective team sites. Nonetheless, the MINURSO force commander remained unable to establish direct contact with the Polisario Front’s military leadership.

During Council members’ 16 October 2024 closed consultations on MINURSO, de Mistura apparently introduced an idea for the partition of the territory of Western Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario Front. According to Reuters, this plan reportedly entailed creating “an independent state in the southern part, and integration of the rest of the territory as part of Morocco, with its sovereignty over it internationally recognized”. De Mistura apparently asked that the Secretary-General assess the “usefulness” of the envoy position if no progress is achieved within the next six months.

Both parties subsequently rejected De Mistura’s plan. In a 17 October 2024 press release, Secretary-General of the Polisario Front Brahim Ghali dismissed the proposal, stressing that any initiative must fully guarantee the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination. Morocco’s Foreign Minister, Nasser Bourita, then rejected the proposal during a 21 October press conference, reaffirming Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara.

On 31 October 2024, the Security Council adopted resolution 2756, extending MINURSO’s mandate for another year. The resolution passed with 12 votes in favour and two abstentions (Russia and then-Council member Mozambique), while Algeria did not participate in the vote. It also introduced new language in the preambular paragraphs, welcoming recent momentum and urging further progress. (For background, see our 31 October 2024 What’s in Blue story.)

The situation on the ground remains tense, characterised by ongoing low-intensity hostilities between Morocco and the Polisario Front. On 9 November 2024, the Polisario Front reportedly launched four missiles at Mahbes, a Moroccan-controlled town in Western Sahara near the Algerian border. The missiles landed near a civilian gathering, though no casualties were reported. In retaliation, the Moroccan army conducted drone strikes targeting Polisario positions, which apparently resulted in casualties, including the death of a senior commander. On 26 November 2024, Moroccan First Lieutenant General Mohamed Berriz met with MINURSO force commander Lieutenant General Fakhrul Ahsan in Agadir to address the security situation.

In January, Morocco reportedly carried out two drone strikes in Polisario-controlled territory. The first strike, conducted near Bir Lahlou on 11 January, resulted in the deaths of four individuals, while a second strike on 18 January in Al Haouza killed three senior Polisario officers.

Key Issues and Options

The underlying issue for the Council is how to facilitate a viable and lasting resolution to the long-standing deadlock over the status of Western Sahara. The lack of progress perpetuates instability, leaving MINURSO with limited ability to fulfil its mandate and increasing the risk of further hostilities in the region. Meanwhile, Council members have to navigate the competing interests of key stakeholders in the conflict.

Significant obstacles remain in the peace process. The November 2020 decision by the Polisario Front to abandon the 1991 ceasefire has led to a rise in hostilities over the last few years. At the same time, Morocco controls more than three-quarters of Western Sahara and has made substantial investments in the region, including a $1.2 billion port project in Dakhla. Moroccan settlers account for nearly two-thirds of the approximately half-million residents of Western Sahara. Regional tensions have also complicated the process. Since Algeria severed diplomatic ties with Morocco in October 2021, there has been no significant progress in restoring relations.

The operational challenges faced by the mission, including restrictions on movement, limited access to key areas, and difficulties in engaging with local interlocutors, are also an issue.

The human rights situation in Western Sahara also remains a matter of concern for Council members. Despite multiple requests from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and strong encouragement from the Security Council in its MINURSO resolutions, access to Western Sahara has not been granted since 2015. According to the Secretary-General’s 1 October 2024 report, OHCHR was unable to conduct any visits to Western Sahara for the ninth consecutive year. The report added that OHCHR continued to receive reports of hindrance, intimidation, and harassment against Sahrawi activists advocating for the right to self-determination, all indications of a shrinking civic space.

Council members could consider holding an informal interactive dialogue (IID) with the various stakeholders of the process, the leadership of MINURSO, Personal Envoy de Mistura, and interested regional and subregional member states and organisations. (The IID is a closed format that, unlike closed consultations, allows for the participation of non-UN officials and briefers.)

Another option could be to issue press elements following consultations scheduled in April to express support for de Mistura’s efforts and urge the relevant parties to resume negotiations, show flexibility in their engagement with the Personal Envoy and each other, and expand on their positions, in the hopes of ending the current impasse and achieving progress towards a political solution.

Council Dynamics

Council members hold divergent positions on Western Sahara. The US, the penholder on Western Sahara, recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over the region in December 2020 during the first administration of US President Donald Trump and committed to opening a consulate in the disputed territory, which has not come to fruition yet. The UK supports a “just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”.

France recently fully endorsed Morocco’s autonomy plan as the “only basis” for a political solution and deepened financial ties with Rabat, pledging over 10 billion euros in investments during Macron’s October 2024 visit. Another major point of friction in Paris-Algiers relations has been France’s efforts to deport Algerian nationals. However, recent weeks have seen efforts to mend ties. Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, in a recent interview, described Macron as the “only point of reference” for restoring relations with France, signalling a willingness to engage in dialogue after a prolonged diplomatic rift.

The African members of the Council do not have a common position. Sierra Leone recognises Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and established a consulate in Dakhla in August 2021. Algeria strongly supports the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination and maintains diplomatic relations with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Guyana, which is a member of the “A3 plus one” grouping, withdrew its recognition of the SADR, dating from 1979, in November 2020.

Among the newly elected Council members, Denmark views Morocco’s Autonomy Plan as “a good basis for an agreed solution between all parties,” while Greece considers it a “serious and credible” approach. Pakistan and Somalia maintain cordial relations with both Algeria and Morocco but neither country recognises the SADR nor endorses Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Meanwhile, in November 2024, Panama suspended diplomatic relations with SADR.

Difficult Council dynamics were apparent during the negotiations on resolution 2756. Algeria argued that its views were neither considered nor given due weight but rather “deliberately ignored” by the penholder (the US). Ahead of the vote on the draft resolution, authored by the US, Algeria tabled two draft amendments to the text, but they did not garner the requisite number of votes to be adopted. The US, meanwhile, reaffirmed its support for Morocco’s autonomy plan, describing it as “serious, credible, and realistic” and as a potential approach to meet the aspirations of the people of Western Sahara.

Source : Security Council Report

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