Tags : Morocco, USA, Western Sahara, Hassan II, hot pursuit, Algeria, Mauritania, Polisario Front,
218. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State1
Algiers, November 23, 1977, 1630Z
2959. UNCINCEUR for POLAD. Subj: The Sahara Two Years After the Green March.2
1. Summary: Although Morocco and Mauritania control most of Sahara militarily and enjoy reasonably solid diplomatic position, case is far from closed. Polisario has developed organizational and even popular base, government in exile, effective international PR effort, as well as seemingly efficient fighting force. At this juncture, Mauritania is hurting militarily, Morocco has felt sufficiently pressed to escalate intensity of conflict, and following seizure of more French hostages, France has increased its commitment to support Mauritania.
2. Despite risk of no-win Algerian-Moroccan war, we see no intention on either side of abandoning hard line positions, and therefore believe U.S. should stay out of conflict and maintain policy of neutrality. At same time, we should remain in touch with Soviets on question as well as with protagonists. End summary.
3. The setting: Events in the Sahara since mid-October have escalated the tension in the region to a level not seen since the immediate post-Green March period in early 1976. The successful Polisario attacks at Sebkhat Oum Drouss Oct 13–14 and at Zoueratt Oct 23 seem to have provoked King Hassan’s declaration of the right of hot pursuit of Polisario guerillas across the Algerian frontier. The Polisario’s Oct 23 kidnapping of two more French tenchnicians working in Mauritania, and the apparent French decision to bolster the defenses of that country, have added a new dimension to conflict and given the Algerian regime both a new cause and perhaps even pause for reflection. The latest attempts at mediation seem to have gone nowhere, and as this telegram is written it appears that the Polisario may have put the fat in the fire by launching new attacks within the Sahara, in southern Morocco, and on the Zoueratt iron ore train in Mauritania.
4. In this situation, we submit the following analysis of where the conflict seems to us to stand, the prospects for a settlement, and how the U.S. interest is affected.
[Page 527]
5. Politico-military balance sheet in the Sahara; the dossier remains open: At the second anniversary of King Hassan’s Green March into the Sahara, conflict over the former colony continues unabated. Major elements in the situation are:
A. Moroccan-Mauritanian position established: After two years, no amount of Algerian-Polisario propaganda can disguise the fact of Moroccan-Mauritanian control over the major strategic points within the former colony. The strength of the Moroccan Armed Forces in and near the Sahara is estimated at 20,000 to 30,000 and the Mauritanian Army has grown rapidly to meet the Polisario’s challenge. Although the Moroccans may have abandoned some remote outposts such as Bir Lahlou in the Eastern Sahara, their control over all major towns is undisputed as is their ability to retake any villages which for tactical reasons they have evacuated. We have the impression that Polisario “operations” against Saharan towns are very minor.
B. Moroccan-Mauritanian position strong: A major Algerian diplomatic campaign has made almost no progress in breaking the virtually unanimous Arab support for Moroccan-Mauritanian takeover of Sahara, and the Africans and the rest of Third World, while often championing the right of self-determination, seem unwilling to enter the fray. Thus, the special OAU summit on Sahara has yet to be held, and few countries other than the eleven that have recognized Sahraoui Republic,3 are prepared to be in the forefront of a fight for repudiation of the Madrid Agreement and condemnation of the Moroccan-Mauritanian occupation. Most Third World governments seem to recognize the complications inherent in situation and prefer to look the other way.
C. The Polisario alive and well: The two years since the Green March have seen Algeria and the Polisario transform the latter from a small, poorly armed band of several hundred into an organization possessed of a “government in exile”, a political structure with representatives around the world, a well organized “popular base” in the Tindouf refugee camps, an effective international PR effort, an apparently efficient fighting force of several thousand men. Within the military stalemate existing on the ground, the Polisario has expanded the sophistication of its armaments and consequently the size and scope of its operations to a point at which the Mauritanian Government is hurting both militarily and economically and the Moroccans are sufficiently under pressure to provoke King Hassan’s November 6 “hot pursuit” speech.4 Diplomatically the Polisario, if unsuccessful in obtaining worldwide support for its cause, has at least begun making [Page 528]its case more effectively around the world, notably in the U.S. and at the U.N. In short, the Polisario appears to be an organization that will be with us for awhile.
D. Refugees: Since the Green March, the Algerians and the Polisario have built a nucleus of people who left the Sahara into an impressive group of refugees all apparently fired with Sahraoui nationalism and a longing to return to their “homeland.” It is certain that, among these people are refugees who lived in the former Spanish Sahara, who feared or were made to fear the Moroccans and to a lesser extent the Mauritanians, and who therefore fled to Algeria. It is only slightly less certain that the camps contain a significant number of Saharans who have arrived from other areas of the desert, either to escape the Sahel drought or simply because the Algerians and Polisario induced them to come. Still, however much one questions their origins, the refugees, thanks to a major organizational effort by the Algerians and the Polisario, have become for the outside world “a people” whose rights as a group must be taken into consideration in a settlement of Sahara problem. Paradoxically, continuation of Sahara conflict is itself developing a national identity among a nomadic people who never really had much of one before.5
E. France and its hostages: Following the Polisario’s taking of two further French hostages in Mauritania last month, France has shown herself more willing to go to Mauritania’s aid even though this has meant the deterioration of Franco-Algerian relations. What effect French assistance may have on the sagging Mauritanian war effort remains to be seen. In Algeria, it has produced a new burst of Franco-phobia and has fueled the regime’s fear of a Rabat-Paris axis bent on destroying the Algerian revolution. But, so far, this Francophobia has not triggered any sort of violent reprisals against French nationals or property in Algeria.
6. Current attitudes: At this stage of conflict, the attitudes of principal players appear to us as follows:
A. Algeria: Algerian Sahara policy would appear to have had some short-term success even if that policy’s mid to long-term benefits to Algeria are questionable. The difficulties facing Mauritania as a result of Polisario activity are clear proof of guerrillas’ effectiveness, and King Hassan’s hot pursuit announcement suggests that Moroccan casualties have become sufficiently serious to force him to react with increased intensity. That this Algerian “success” has brought Algeria and Morocco closer to a war neither side wants is a point that we feel is [Page 529]not lost on the Algerian leadership. For the moment, however, the Algerian regime is obsessed with the diplomatic defeat represented by Madrid Agreement and seems totally preoccupied with making the Moroccans pay for that setback.6 The leadership here has good reason to believe it is scoring points in this department, and despite the apparent disinterest of the Algerian people to the struggle, its overriding interest at the moment seems to be in keeping up the pressure.
B. Polisario: The Polisario’s interest in the conflict differs from the Algerians’ only in that it would not appear bound by fear of an Algerian-Moroccan war. Such a conflict would serve only to dramatize its cause, and could produce a new situation from which it could conceivably profit.
C. Morocco: It appears from our vantage point that King Hassan’s commitment to his present Sahara policy remains total and that of his people only slightly less so. Moroccans talk from time to time of “face saving” solutions for Boumediene, but are understandably unwilling to make any of the sort of concessions the Algerians are looking for. Morocco’s continued talk of giving Algeria economic concessions in a Moroccan Sahara misses the essential point that the Algerian interest in conflict is geopolitical, not economic.
D. Mauritania: While more directly threatened by the current state of affairs in Sahara than King Hassan, our impression from Algiers is that the Mauritanian Government’s commitment to staying with the Sahara war remains high. This impression is supported by a general preception here that the current state of affairs involves Ould Daddah in a struggle for his political life.
7. U.S. interest: To sum up, the protagonists in the Sahara conflict seem for the present committed to their present policies, and no political or military solution is in sight. In this situation, we see the following U.S. interests:
A. To stay out: The Sahara conflict is not one which we can reasonably expect to influence nor one in which we have a vital stake.7 A war between Algeria and Morocco would touch a major American interest only if the LNG facilities at Arzew were attacked, and a military victory by either Algeria or Morocco would not be of crucial importance to us. We would therefore do better to limit our efforts, as we have been doing, to counseling moderation. Both sides have asked, and will probably continue to ask, that we play a mediatory role; at the moment, [Page 530]however, each is committed to a policy diametrically opposed to that of the other and appears interested in our “mediation” largely as a means of encouraging us to exert pressure on the other and of presenting statesmanlike image to the world.
B. To continue our present policies: With no political solution to problem evident, our present policy of neutrality on the substance of issue seems most logical. The administration seems to have succeeded in convincing the Algerian regime of its neutrality in the conflict, and we should strive to maintain this stance by avoiding taking positions on the issue in forums such as U.N. Our present level of military assistance to Morocco is accepted as a fact of life of the region. We believe it best to continue it at its current contemplated level.8
C. To keep in touch with Soviets: A major threat to our interest would be an escalation of some future Algerian-Moroccan conflict in which we and the Soviets would find ouselves resupplying our respective clients. We have the impression that the Soviets, perhaps because of their interest in Moroccan phosphates, are more genuinely neutral on the Sahara question now (see Algiers 2954)9 than they were in 1975 and 1976. It is obviously in US interest that they remain so. We believe it would be well to discuss issue regularly with the Soviets and to urge their continued neutrality.
D. To continue high-level contact with the protagonists: To keep up with possible shifts in the attitudes of the protagonists, we should continue the practice of discussing the Sahara issue often with regime spokesmen from both sides. The Boumediene and Hassan visits to Washington will be useful in this regard.
8. We would welcome comments on foregoing particularly from Embassies Nouakchott and Rabat as well as other addressees.
Haynes
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v17p3/d218
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256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco1
Washington, July 30, 1980, 2356Z
202300. Subject: Reported Moroccan Policy of Pursuit Across International Borders.
1. (S) Entire text.
2. We are concerned at current indications that increased Moroccan combat effectiveness may be accompanied by increased tendency toward pursuit of Polisario forces including temporary violations of international frontiers. These indications include possible recent penetrations of Algerian and Mauritanian airspace by RMAF aircraft. [Page 628]Recently, we have statement to us by Moroccan source2 [less than 1 line not declassified] that the RMAF is now prepared to pursue Polisario even if it means violating neighbor’s air space. Source also indicated that eventual attacks against Polisario bases in Algeria or Moroccan-Algerian aircraft dog-fights could not be ruled out.
3. Department cannot view with equanimity an apparent development of Moroccan tactical doctrine which entails significant new risk of engaging Morocco in a direct military confrontation with Algeria. We believe therefore that at an early opportunity you should convey our concern to King Hassan, either directly or through suitable intermediary. Circumstances of Moroccan source’s talk with our people were such that you cannot refer directly to it in discussion with Hassan but we believe you can make the point by indirection.
4. In formulating your specific message, you may incorporate the following talking points:
—We continue strongly to support the goal of a compromise settlement in terms that all interested parties and particularly Morocco can live with.
—We understand Morocco’s need to make a strong military performance against Polisario. This was an important concern underlying the changes we made in our arms policy last fall.
—While we have made clear our continuing support for Morocco’s territorial integrity, we have at the same time believed that that integrity would not be enhanced by any widening of the war, particularly if it involved Algeria.
—We told the Polisario this spring that we would not maintain a continuing dialogue with them while they were operating inside territory of Morocco.3
—We are therefore concerned at recent reports that in late June or early July RMAF aircraft entered Algerian air space in pursuit of Polisario forces. We understand that similar incursion may have occurred in Mauritania.
—We hope that this does not mean that henceforth Moroccan combat aircraft and perhaps other forces may be authorized to follow doctrine of pursuit of retreating Polisario forces into Algerian territory. We find it easy to construct scenario under which this could quickly lead to a serious confrontation between two countries.
—We do not believe such a doctrine of hot pursuit is needed to persuade either the Polisario or the Algerian leadership of the impor[Page 629]tance of compromise as a prerequisite of a negotiated settlement. On the contrary, an extension of the war resulting from hot pursuit could adversely affect Moroccan position internationally and in the U.S.
Muskie
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v17p3/d256
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257. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State1
Rabat, August 2, 1980, 1237Z
5436. Subject: Reported Moroccan Policy of Pursuit Across International Borders. Ref: (A) State 202300,2 (B) State 202281.3
1. (S)–Entire text.
2. Summary and introduction: Ambassador Duke delivered message (ref B) and carried out instruction (ref A) with Royal Counselor Guedira afternoon August 1; DCM accompanied him. Guedira received us at home, alone. Meeting lasted an hour and was cordial throughout.
3. Ambassador opened with presentation of Deputy Secretary’s message (second reftel) which Guedira received with pleasure, asking for copy to show to King (later same day).
4. Ambassador, noting he was speaking under instruction, then moved to question of Moroccan policy with respect to pursuit across international borders. He rehearsed points made in para 4 first reftel ticks (except fourth, on Polisario dialog, which inopportune in light Guedira’s replies—see below) eliciting firm response from Guedira along following lines:
A. King, from outset, has been concerned to contain conflict with Algeria at lowest possible level. As consequence, when Polisario began to attack incontestably Moroccan territory from Algeria and to retreat [Page 630]into Algeria (which, from the point of view of international law, places responsibility squarely upon Algeria), King wrote Boumediene a letter, which Guedira said he drafted. Letter stated that Morocco had not heretofore exercised right of hot pursuit (droit de suite) and did not now intend to do so, but should not be pushed too far.
B. Guedira, in response Ambassador’s question, said he knew King’s mind and will on this issue and could affirm unequivocally that Morocco’s policy had not rpt not changed. What had triggered these representations from a friendly government?
C. Ambassador, having adverted to June/July RMAF penetration of Algerian airspace and possible recent incursion into Mauritanian air,4 Guedira nodded and said that Algiers had protested at the time through Tunisian Ambassador here (Tunisia is Algeria’s protecting power in Morocco since rupture between Rabat and Algiers). Moroccans had responded that incident was inadvertent (“border is hard to determine at jet speed”), aggression against Algeria was not rpt not intended, and Morocco’s posture on droit de suite remained unchanged.
D. Ambassador, Guedira continued, had been present when King had received US UN PermRep McHenry.5 King had told McHenry that he wanted Morocco and Algeria as well as other parties to the Saharan dispute to talk. King’s attitude had been constant. It was unchanged. King would not do anything vis-a-vis Algeria, particularly now (read in the post-Freetown summit phase)6 which would make it harder, or even impossible for Algerians to sit down with Morocco.
E. Guedira went on to express “our” deep preoccupation with the trend of Mauritanian policy towards Morocco. “They are worse than the Algerians”. He denied any Moroccan incursion and pointed to incoherence of Mauritanian allegations of Moroccan attacks first on this town then on that one etc. He asked whether we knew that population of Nouadhibou had demonstrated July 31 “against GIRM’s lies”? Ambassador responded that Boulanouar admittedly very close to border; Mauritanians had, however, shown our Charge American-made ordnance which, they asserted, was used by Moroccan aircraft in the alleged incident.
5. Ambassador closed this part of conversation by presenting Guedira with copy of HFAC (Zablocki) July 8 report on CODEL’s recent [Page 631]visit to North Africa.7 While GOM would not agree completely with contents of the report, Ambassador said, it nevertheless reflects authors’ understanding of Morocco’s interest in moving towards a negotiated solution of the Saharan problem, a crucial point.
6. Conversation then moved to subject of Morocco’s post-OAU Freetown Summit intentions, a topic we will cover in septel. It ended with request by Guedira that we supply informal copy of talking points Ambassador had used to carry out his instructions, and this was subsequently done.
7. Ambassador has not had opportunity clear this message but is aware of its transmission.
Sebastian
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v17p3/d257
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258. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter1
Washington, August 4, 1980
[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]
3. Moroccan “Hot Pursuit” Doctrine Denied; Mauritanian Accusations: Ambassador Duke has raised the question of Moroccan “hot pursuit” policy with Hassan’s Royal Counselor Guedira,2 pursuant to instructions we sent him last week after learning that Moroccan aircraft violated Algerian airspace.3 Guedira “affirmed unequivocally that Morocco’s policy had not changed”; that Morocco had not heretofore exercised the right to hot pursuit and did not now intend to do so; and that Hassan would not do anything vis-a-vis Algeria that would make it harder for the Algerians to begin talks with Morocco.
[Page 632]
Meanwhile, Mauritanian authorities and media have been hotly accusing Morocco of an unprovoked air attack against Mauritanian territory on July 29.4 Their story has shifted several times both as to the location of the attack and the damage, but an onsite inspection by our Charge in Nouakchott lends credence to the view that ordnance struck ground up to 6 km inside Mauritanian territory. The Moroccan action was apparently limited to a couple of strafing runs close to Mauritania’s border with the western Sahara. The Mauritanians have chosen to make a major issue of it. They withdrew their Ambassador from Rabat last weekend. Morocco has categorically denied that any such attack took place.
In Nouakchott, President Haidalla protested vigorously to our Charge over the use of U.S. arms in Moroccan aggression, since unexploded rockets allegedly found after the “attack” were of U.S. origin, as confirmed by our Charge’s onsite inspection.5
Whatever the facts (and we may never know for sure), the Mauritanian outcry seems designed essentially to whip up anti-Moroccan sentiment and perhaps set the stage for steps to tilt Mauritanian “neutrality” in the west Saharan dispute closer to pro-Polisario, pro-Algerian positions.
[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v17p3/d258
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386. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Recipients1
281066.
Washington, October 22, 1981, 0038Z
Nouakchott for Asst Sec Crocker. Subject: Western Sahara: Moroccan-Mauritanian Tensions. Ref: A) Rabat 7641,2 B) FBIS NC 2022041,3 C) Nouakchott 5020,4 D) State 277390 (Notal),5 E) FBIS NC 211500,6 F) State 280002.7
1. Secret—Entire text.
2. Tensions caused by the Oct 13–16 battle between Moroccan and Polisario forces at Guelta Zemmour in the Western Sahara have now spread to include Mauritania. King Hassan has warned the Mauritanians against use of its territory by the Polisario (ref A) and Morocco’s General Dlimi has reportedly claimed that Morocco’s [Page 792]Air Force has struck at Polisario forces inside Mauritania (ref B). Mauritania’s President Haidalla has denied both the King’s allegations and Dlimi’s claim. (Ref C.)
3. These developments increase the urgency of action on the part of the OAU Implementation Committee to begin negotiations on the cease-fire envisioned at Nairobi II. The Secretary has already recommended that Kenya’s President Moi take the lead in this regard. (Ref D.) We are aware of press reports that Moi has sent a message to the Polisario (and presumably other parties) urging an end to the fighting (ref E) in reply to which the Polisario has reiterated its demand for direct negotiations. We believe that the Implementation Committee itself provides a viable forum for negotiations to this end, and that the Polisario’s demand, and Morocco’s refusal, to negotiate a cease-fire directly should not rpt not delay the opening of negotiations.
4. For Nairobi. Citing the increasing tensions between Morocco and Mauritania, you should once again raise our suggestion that the Implementation Committee convene to begin negotiations towards a ceasefire. You should seek information on and express appreciation for efforts President Moi has undertaken and encourage the Kenyans to persist despite procedural obstacles, i.e. direct vs. indirect talks. (You may share with the Kenyans indications we have from the Algerians that they would not rpt not support the Polisario demand for direct talks. (Ref F.)
5. For Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Khartoum, Lagos and Freetown. Based on public information, such as ref E, of renewed call for ceasefire negotiations you should reinforce at appropriate levels in Foreign Ministries the approach we are making to the Kenyans, if you believe it will be helpful. You should not rpt not characterize Kenyan effort as US initiative.
6. For Rabat: Septel provides guidance for urging Moroccan restraint in dealing with Mauritania.8
7. For Algiers. You should encourage the Algerians to use their influence with the Polisario to calm the situation in the area and to encourage Polisario participation in negotiations under Implementation Committee auspices (i.e. indirect talks) to bring about a ceasefire.
8. For Nouakchott. Express our hope that Mauritania can remain a non-belligerent and take all measures within its capabilities to insure that its territory is not exploited by any foreign forces.
9. For Dakar and Jidda: You should describe to Governments of Senegal and Saudi Arabia diplomatic efforts USG is taking to help prevent further deterioration of situation. Since SAE and GOS were recipients of special pleas from King Hassan, which GOM has shared with us, we would like to work with them in any way they feel useful to help defuse situation. While the exact situation on the ground is a subject of contradictory reports, it is clear that tensions have dramatically escalated and we hope friends of Morocco and Mauritania can be helpful in resolving the problem.
Clark
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v24/d386
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