Meeting with Outgoing Tunisian Ambassador Ben Yahia

Tags: Ben Yahia, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Western Sahara, Gaddafi, Oujda Agreement, Colin Powell,

366. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, September 9, 1988

SUBJECT : Meeting with Outgoing Tunisian Ambassador Ben Yahia

PARTICIPANTS : Colin Powell, William J. Burns, NSC Staff, Peter Burleigh, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, Ambassador Habib Ben Yahia, Mr. Hedi Gharbi, Deputy Chief of Mission

Ambassador Ben Yahia paid a brief farewell call on General Powell on September 9 following his photo opportunity with the President.2 Ben Yahia thanked Powell for his support for Tunisia, and pledged that he would do all he could in his new position in the Foreign Ministry to further strengthen U.S.-Tunisian ties.

Ben Yahia then explained at some length Tunisia’s approach to relations with Libya. He said recent progress toward greater Maghreb cooperation offered a means of “regional containment” of Qadhafi. At the same time, there was a great deal of “fermentation” inside Libya. Qadhafi’s partial relaxation of some internal controls had allowed Libyans a glimpse of what more open societies had to offer. Since the GOT opened its borders with Libya in 1987, fully one-third of the Libyan population had visited Tunisia. Their experiences in Tunisia only reinforced their interest in pressing for further loosening of Qadhafi’s economic, social, and political controls.

Ben Yahia emphasized that the Tunisian government’s profound distrust of Qadhafi had not diminished one bit. But Tunisia had to co-exist with Libya and movement toward increased regional economic integration and related changes inside Libya gave the GOT a way to come to grips with the threat that Qadhafi posed. Tunisia remained deeply concerned about Qadhafi’s CW program, his support for Palestinian extremist groups, and his habitual efforts to destabilize his [Page 751]neighbors. The best strategy for countering that threat, from Tunisia’s perspective, was to build regional restraints on Qadhafi’s behavior and encourage the process of internal Libyan change that was underway. This did not mean open-ended political agreements with Qadhafi; Ben Yahia stressed that “we won’t make the same mistakes Morocco did in signing the Oujda Accord.”

In the meantime, Ben Yahia said, Tunisia remained firmly committed to close consultation with the United States on Libya. Ongoing cooperation with DOD and CIA would continue. The U.S. needed to trust Tunisia’s judgment on Qadhafi. “Benign neglect” might be the best U.S. approach to dealing with Qadhafi—since it denied him the international attention that he thrived upon, and that magnified his role out of all proportion to his real importance.

General Powell responded that the United States had full confidence in Tunisia’s judgment. We too preferred that Qadhafi’s role not be hyped. At the same time, Ben Yahia was well aware of U.S. concerns about Qadhafi’s continuing troublemaking. His CW program3 and support for terrorists were very serious matters. So long as these activities continued, it was dangerous to grant him political respectability—and we hoped Tunisia would not give him credibility and legitimacy that he did not deserve, and had not earned.

Ben Yahia reassured Powell that the GOT would continue to deal very carefully and cautiously with Libya. He added that President Ben Ali was determined to push ahead on a bold program of domestic political liberalization and economic reform. Greater democracy and privatization—borrowing from the U.S. model—were very important goals for Ben Ali. General Powell said the U.S. applauded Tunisia’s efforts.

Finally, Ben Yahia explained that Ben Ali had been very disappointed that he had been unable to visit Washington in September. Three main concerns had prevented him from coming. First, Tunisia’s domestic political calendar was overloaded, as Ben Ali sought to complete a series of reforms prior to the anniversary of his assumption of power on November 7. Second, Tunisia was heavily involved in regional diplomacy, particularly efforts to mediate a settlement between Chad and Libya and to promote a resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. Third, the PLO had still not made up its mind whether to hold the fall PNC meeting in Tunis or Algiers. A Tunis venue would create massive security headaches for the GOT, and Ben Ali—a “very security-minded fellow”—felt he could not make any extended foreign trips while this question remained.

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General Powell noted that he was sorry that Ben Ali had been unable to come to Washington as planned. This had caused some temporary administrative problems, but would have no negative effect on the strong U.S.-Tunisian relationship. He concluded by congratulating Ben Yahia again on his new appointment, and reiterating the U.S. Government’s deep appreciation for Ben Yahia’s superb service in Washington.

Source: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: 09/01/88–12/31/88. Secret. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation, Burns sent it to Schott Stevens under a September 12 covering memorandum recommending that Schott Stevens approve it. There is no indication that Schott Stevens approved it.↩

In a five minute meeting in the Oval Office, Reagan “expressed appreciation for Ambassador Ben Yahia’s distinguished service in Washington” and promised “that the Administration would continue to work to strengthen bilateral ties with Tunisia.” (Memorandum of Conversation, September 9; ibid.)↩

See footnote 1, Document 284.↩

Source : State Department

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