Morocco’s Hassan II used union with Gadafi to blackmail USA

Etiquettes : Morocco, Hassan II, Libya, Gadafi, United States, Western Sahara,

250. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State1
9721.

Rabat, October 11, 1985, 0914Z

D for Deputy Secretary Whitehead; P for Under Secretary Armacost; NEA for Assistant Secretary Murphy; Dept please pass NSC for Mr. McFarlane. Subject: King Hassan Cancels Planned U.S. Visit.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Abdelfattah Frej, Secretary to King Hassan, and Foreign Minister Filali separately informed Ambassador October 11 that Hassan has decided not to attend U.N. 40th anniversary celebrations as he had long planned. Both GOM officials first attributed Hassan’s decision to cancel to the proliferation of regional events engaging his attention, but then obliquely made it clear that the real reason for cancellation is GOM-USG inability to arrange a private meeting for Hassan with President Reagan during Hassan’s projected U.S. visit. This confirms fragmentary signals we had begun to receive early this week from sources close to Palace that Hassan might well cancel if Presidential meeting not in offing, but that local rationale for cancelling would be regional developments.

3. In his speech opening Parliament late October 11, Hassan himself announced publicly that he has decided not to go to New York “for several reasons”.

4. Prime Minister Karim Lamrani will now lead Moroccan delegation to New York for anniversary celebrations. He plans to leave Morocco October 18 to arrive New York October 19. PriMin will be preceded to New York by Filali. (Septel gives further details of their trip and hope to see senior U.S. officials).2 We assume, and strongly recommend, that PriMin be invited to President’s October 23 reception now that Hassan will remain here. Filali and spouse have accepted the President’s invitation.

5. Hassan is clearly disappointed at inability to arrange a meeting with the President. From their recent comments, Hassan’s closest associates, i.e., Filali, tend to attribute non-meeting to continuing USG concerns about the Morocco-Libya union. While we do not predict any [Page 519]dramatic change in U.S.-Moroccan relations in the months ahead, we do think that things are likely to remain on dead-center and that there will not be much movement in any domain until the President and Hassan have an opportunity to meet face-to-face for the air-clearing discussions which Embassy recommended in Rabat 9058.3 Ambassador strongly recommends that Department and White House place Hassan prominently on the list of state or official visitors in the first half of 1986 and that we be prepared to tell GOM at an early date that we are prepared to schedule such a visit. Our so informing the GOM would salve Hassan’s present hurt and embarrassment as well as prepare the way for a meeting (at the top levels of government) which should go far toward protecting and extending U.S. interest over the years ahead.

Nassif

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1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850729–0163. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to USUN.↩

2. In telegram 9722 from Rabat, October 11, the Embassy reported that Filali told Nassif that he “will return to New York next Tuesday, October 15, to have further discussions on UNGA business (above all, Western Sahara).” Karim-Lamrani, meanwhile, would arrive on October 19. The Embassy reported that he “very much hopes to meet with Vice President Bush.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850729–0172)↩

3. In telegram 9058 from Rabat, September 25, Nassif reported that he had been called in by Basri, who told him that the King wanted to meet with him later that day in order to discuss Hassan’s upcoming visit to New York. Nassif continued: “I assume that the King’s urgent request to see me follows receipt by him of word from Ambassador Jorio that the President will be unable to receive Hassan in New York.” Nassif predicted that Hassan will “almost certainly press me hard for reconsideration of the White House decision.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850682–0764)↩

Source : Department of State

#Morocco #USA #Libya #Gadhafi #HassanII #WesternSahara