The Unspoken Realities of Morocco’s African Policy

Tags: Morocco, Western Sahara, African Union, CEN-SAD, COREP, Mrs. Zuma, Algeria, South Africa, Malabo Summit

In its relations with Africa, there is a clear « before » and « after » regarding Morocco’s membership in the African Union (AU).

Before joining the AU, Morocco maintained a limited presence at African sectoral ministerial conferences, which predated the AU and of which Morocco was a member.

The issue of Western Sahara has been the primary driver of Moroccan diplomacy, with significant effort dedicated to finding a framework to counter the influence of Algeria and South Africa on the African continent and to thwart any African initiative related to the Western Sahara conflict.

In this context, Rabat attempted to reactivate the CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) but pulled back at the last minute after agreeing to host a summit of this organization. A diplomatic note highlighted that « Politically, CEN-SAD is the only organization that offers Morocco regional outreach before its AU membership. This organization, made up of 24 African countries, mostly from the Sahel-Saharan region, serves as Morocco’s Trojan horse to assert itself in this strategic area, aiming to undermine Algeria’s influence. »

Morocco has considered returning to the AU since 2012, the year when Mrs. Dlamini-Zuma was elected as the head of the African Commission. She quickly became Morocco’s scapegoat due to her initiatives pressing the UN Security Council on the Western Sahara issue.

In July, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC), chaired by Algerian Smail Chergui, proposed at the Malabo Summit that former Mozambican president Joachim Chissano be appointed the AU’s Special Envoy for Western Sahara. Following his appointment, he immediately reached out to the so-called « Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara » (USA, France, Spain, UK, Russia).

From that point, the main bodies of the AU, including the African Commission and the PSC, became Morocco’s adversaries. Morocco viewed them as entry points for Sahrawi allies to insert initiatives aimed at placing the Western Sahara issue on the AU Summit agenda.

Morocco’s primary diplomatic goal in Africa thus became preventing the Western Sahara issue from being “co-opted within the AU by Morocco’s adversaries” and countering the AU’s “maneuvers to interfere and involve itself in the UN-led process for resolving the Western Sahara issue,” according to a diplomatic note.

At present, the Peace and Security Council includes members from Congo, Kenya, Egypt, Zambia, Nigeria (until March 2019), Burundi, Chad, Rwanda, Uganda, Algeria, Botswana, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Togo (until March 2018). This composition is largely favorable to Morocco. Another note from Tagma indicated that the balance of power within COREP (Committee of Permanent Representatives) was also favorable to Rabat.

“The Moroccan government has always considered its relations with Africa a priority in its foreign policy, primarily to assert its sovereignty over Western Sahara,” according to a note from the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasizing how Morocco’s expansionist ambitions shape its diplomacy.

Initially, Morocco sought to bypass the AU by strengthening its presence in countries considered part of the « first circle » by Moroccan diplomatic notes: Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Gabon. “This strengthening of strategic partnerships with key countries is a diplomatic priority in Africa,” the note stated.

At the same time, Morocco made efforts to infiltrate all mass organizations within the AU—such as those dealing with youth, sports, and culture—as well as the sectoral ministerial conferences that predated the AU. Morocco’s involvement in these organizations allowed the government to project an image of active engagement in Africa domestically.

Morocco also attempted to undermine all African regional organizations, particularly those related to the Malian conflict and the situation in the Sahel, where Algeria has established itself as a recognized regional power. For Rabat, “Mali was excluded from Morocco’s diplomatic action due to its support for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic on one hand, and the resurgence of Algeria’s influence in Mali on the other.”

Alarmed, Morocco sought ways to portray itself as a regional power and influential player in an area where French interests were threatened. Ouali Tagma then proposed reactivating CEN-SAD.

Moroccan diplomats identified a major obstacle to Morocco’s economic strategy in Africa: the AU’s position as the « preferred, even exclusive interlocutor for international actors in the context of regional partnerships, » including with the EU, Japan, China, France, the USA, Korea, the Arab countries, South America, Turkey, India, Russia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Morocco’s accession to the AU marks a new phase in its African policy. The PSC could be used to bypass debate within COREP, as it reports directly to the Conference of Heads of State. In fact, the January Decision matrix mentions the PSC as the body responsible for implementation, even though the Decision mandates the President of the Commission. This maneuver to avoid debate could be seen as procedurally improper since the Decision stipulates that the report on Western Sahara must be presented to the Executive Council (and therefore COREP) by the President of the Commission. However, since the AU is not particularly known for its procedural rigor, it is not out of the question that the PSC could be used to achieve objectives that could not be pursued through COREP, where the balance of power favors Morocco.

Constant vigilance is necessary to counter this potential scenario.

SOURCES :

#Morocco #WesternSahara #Polisario #AfricanUnion #CENSAD #Algeria #SouthAfrica