Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, United States, State Department, Sahel,
By Samba Sall
Senior US officials, specifically including the US Ambassador in Morocco should be encouraged, indeed required, to visit the Western Sahara. Such a visit is now prohibited by State Department. While perhaps arguably useful in the past, today this prohibition conveys the impression that the United States is so unconcerned with the problems in the Sahara/Sahel and the Western Sahara that it does not need the first-hand views of its most senior diplomats to help inform and guide the process of resolving these issues.
The United States should take every available opportunity to clearly state, in unambiguous terms, its chosen policy of support for a mutually acceptable political solution based on the only reasonable and viable option available, that of sovereignty and autonomy. Doing anything else only continues to encourage the Polisario Front that it does not need to compromise. This has the effect of making the United States a part of the problem, not the solution.
The United States should also use its influence in the Security Council to make clear that this is indeed the only realistic way forward and help end the charade that any meaningful compromise can be found through old formulas that have already failed and are, in any case, clearly to be avoided.
The policy decision to restrict US access to the Western Sahara and deny US development assistance funds to the region should be reversed, as Congress has now both authorized and urged. Morocco has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the territory to improve its basic infrastructure and quality of life and would welcome US participation in meeting genuine humanitarian and development needs in the area. This kind of engagement would demonstrate through concrete actions that the United States is fully committed to its support for autonomy. Further, it would build confidence among the Sahrawi people to endorse such an outcome. Such actions would also help project an image elsewhere in the Sahara/Sahel that there are viable, peaceful alternatives to the chaos being promoted by a rapidly expanding revolutionary jihadist population in the region. Most importantly, funding that leads to improved governance and economic development will aid in stabilizing the region.
The rest of the State Department should align their internal decision-making criteria vis-à-vis the Western Sahara with Secretary Clinton’s verbal statements of support for the Moroccan autonomy initiative. Inside the State Department, there is bureaucratic stalling that inhibits creative approaches and initiatives that could lead to resolution of the conflict. As Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote recently, “As a result [of Obama’s priority on domestic political affairs], his grand redefinition of U.S. foreign policy is vulnerable to dilution or delay by upper-level officials who have the bureaucratic predisposition to favor caution over action and the familiar over the innovative1. »
Nowhere is this more evident than in US policy on Western Sahara where senior officials below the level of Secretary Clinton routinely misses opportunities to support the Moroccan initiative and instead proffer bland statements of support for the “UN process,” as though this was somehow a substitute for US national interest or even consistent with what the US has clearly stated is its alleged policy priority. This kind of ambivalence serves to add only further confusion to an already difficult situation and perpetuates the problem rather than contributing anything useful towards a solution.
Existing US foreign assistance programs in Morocco targeting social and economic development should include the inhabitants of the Western Sahara, again as Congress has now specifically authorized, especially those focusing on health, education, entrepreneurship, and similar capacity-building initiatives.
The people of the Western Sahara have clearly demonstrated their commitment to democratic participation within the Moroccan context by large turnouts in local and national elections despite Polisario Front calls for boycotts and cancellations. Continued support for NGO, civil society, and local government programs will enhance the US presence in the region and US support for their democratic participation. It will also add much needed US support to the only area in the increasingly volatileSahara/Sahel region that continues to be an island of stability, security, social and economic progress and democratic practice. Surely an example the US would encourage others in the immediate region to emulate.
The US should help establish conditions for a successful autonomy arrangement by engaging US agencies including USAID, USTDA, OPIC, and EX-IM Bank in support of enhancing private sector investments in Western Sahara. America’s European partners are already investing in key sectors in the region. There is no reason that the United States should not follow suit.
The United States should recognize the Western Sahara conflict as an impediment to US economic investment and opportunity in North Africa. Once the conflict is resolved, the US might have better leverage with Algeria by responding to its need to attract US investments in their energy sector, tourism, infrastructure and a much needed broader diversification of their economy. More importantly, this offers the US an array of opportunities to promote broader regional economic integration. Morocco’s free trade agreement with the US will benefit the Maghreb countries, principally Algeria, clearly demonstrating the benefits of settling the conflict.
The UN should implement its mandate to encourage Sahrawi leadership in both the Tindouf camps and Western Sahara region to work together on matters of mutual interest affecting the region. One of the original confidence building measures, this dialogue can help build towards the broader integration on interests on both sides of the berm.
The United States should urge the UNHCR and the Security Council to urge Algeria to respect their legal obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol and reduce the burden associated with maintaining the camps in a hostile physical environment. UNHCR should immediately begin a public information campaign in the camps to inform the refugees of their rights under international law, including identification, documentation, access to travel documents, and freedom of movement. If the UNHCR carries out a census in the camps, those results, along with freedom of movement that includes voluntary repatriation for the refugees, and more accountability for international food and medical assistance, would drastically change conditions in the camps making them obsolete, thus greatly reducing the humanitarian crisis and the vulnerability of the refugee population to other dangerous enticements.
In addition to a voluntary repatriation program, the US should work with UNHCR and the UN Security Council to encourage and provide support for any Algerian efforts to allow the refugees to settle elsewhere in Algeria if they choose an option other than repatriation to Morocco. Again, this should help reduce regional tensions and dangers.
#Morocco #USA #WesternSahara #Algeria
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