Tags: Morocco, Western Sahara, UN, Christopher Ross, Human Rights, MINURSO,
Analytical Note: The New Strategy of the Personal Envoy: What Positioning for Morocco
Ambassador Christopher Ross has been the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara since 2009. Compared to his predecessors, and with the notable exception of James Baker, he has shown a certain longevity in his current role.
He is an ambiguous, ambivalent figure who has a real ability to tell each of his interlocutors exactly what they want to hear. It cannot be said in absolute terms that he harbors anti-Moroccan sentiments. However, he is undeniably skeptical about Morocco’s willingness to deepen reforms in democracy and the rule of law.
He is part of a faction within the State Department that has always harbored some mistrust towards Morocco.
Since taking office as Personal Envoy, Mr. Ross has not acted as a negotiator. He has never submitted his own proposal for resolving the dispute. Instead, he behaves more like a mediator. This is where his approach becomes contradictory and sometimes confusing. He gives the impression of having a modest view of his role and says he only wants to create favorable conditions for launching a genuine negotiation dynamic. At the same time, he operates on two fronts simultaneously:
He intervenes directly in negotiating Security Council resolutions by proposing amendments through the American and British delegations.
This type of intervention, which constitutes a dangerous and entirely unprecedented approach, had been flagged in the past. A mediator should remain neutral and objective in negotiating resolutions and not seek to interfere.
Regarding human rights, his position has not changed one iota. He has always officially stated that this issue is not within his mandate, yet he has continuously pressured the High Commissioner to become more involved in this file.
These ambiguities in Mr. Ross’s attitudes and strategy have sometimes led to misunderstandings that have undermined trust in his relationship with Morocco.
Strategically, the real question is: What does Mr. Ross want, and what is the nature of the solution he might propose?
The Personal Envoy has always remained vague about the nature of the solution. He says Morocco should not have proposed the Autonomy Initiative and that it would have been better if this proposal had come from the mediator, thereby giving it greater legitimacy in negotiations. He seems to forget that J. Baker had proposed a Framework Agreement (Autonomy Plan) in 2001, which was rejected by Algeria and the Polisario. In 2006, Morocco was strongly encouraged by its allies, particularly the United States, to present a compromise proposal.
The Personal Envoy now indicates for the first time that the time has come to think strategically and to lay out the terms of a mutually acceptable solution.
In other words, the proposals put on the negotiation table by the Parties so far have not led to progress, and therefore, a new approach must be considered. The Personal Envoy is gradually coming to the conclusion that, after five years of mediation, he must gather the necessary ingredients from both sides to present his own initiative. In his view, this might involve offering a bit more than autonomy and a bit less than independence.
For tactical reasons, he will not present anything formal before the elections in Algeria next April and will use shuttle diplomacy to create the impression that the plan he will propose will be the result of his discussions with the Parties.
In reality, Mr. Ross has been considering this for at least two years and has hired two mediation experts to assist him.
Fundamentally, the missing element guiding Mr. Ross’s actions is understanding Washington’s strategy in the region.
Before serving the UN in a formal capacity, Mr. Ross embodies the American vision on this issue. Since his appointment, Washington has decentralized the management of this file. In fact, the American position is strongly influenced by Mr. Ross himself. This dual role, one official and the other unofficial, complicates the situation.
The only option that has not yet been tested with the parties is the confederal formula. Does Mr. Ross have this in mind? It poses a fundamental problem: in a confederal system, the right to secession is guaranteed by the Constitution.
At this stage and in light of this situation, Morocco’s positioning could be as follows:
Engage with Mr. Ross and remain in listening mode for now. He will present a questionnaire to which we can respond later. At the same time, we could question him extensively to get a clearer idea of his ultimate goal, the nature of the solution, and its contours.
Tactically, interacting with Mr. Ross is useful as it helps to fill the Secretary-General’s Report and prevent undue focus on human rights issues in April.
Hold Algeria accountable for its passivity in the negotiation process while being active in international forums defending the Polisario.
The new regional strategic context regarding security and counter-terrorism (Sahel) requires greater regional cooperation.
Maintain firmness on human rights aspects. Morocco is progressing at its own pace, and we will not accept any form of international « coaching. » The reaction last April was not a temporary phenomenon. We will respond with the same firmness to defend our interests.
Be open to the process. Morocco is a responsible country. We are sincerely engaged in the negotiation process, but we want to understand what we are committing to and what the objectives are.
Morocco has a vision centered on regionalization (ECOSOC Report) that respects several parameters: good governance, direct involvement of populations, and a new approach to security management.
Morocco is not in a wait-and-see position regarding the status quo imposed by Algeria. We are advancing on all national and regional fronts.
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