Maroc : Evaluation du rapport de Ban Ki-moon d’avril 2013 sur le Sahara Occidental

A la lecture du Rapport du Secrétaire Général (SG) au Conseil de Sécurité sur la Question Nationale, il transparait que ledit document s’inscrit pleinement dans le cadre d’une stratégie visant à légitimer la création d’un mécanisme de surveillance dans les provinces du Sud.

Pour cela, le SG a surpondéré la dimension Droit de l’Homme, la question des ressources naturelles et la thématique de la prétendue frustration de la jeunesse dans lesdits territoires.

Retour sur un Rapport subtilement orienté en faveur de la position de nos adversaires :

1-Une déresponsabilisation systématique de la partie algérienne

-Le Secrétaire Général fait l’impasse sur la responsabilité avérée et manifeste de l’Algérie notamment sur la question de l’enregistrement, par l’omission de toute mention explicite à celle-ci, tout en donnant une fausse impression d’avancer sur cette question.

2-Une remise en cause de la prééminence de l’initiative marocaine

-Son allusion aux arguments avancés par le Maroc lors des contacts avec M. Ross laisse entendre qu’il souhaite remettre en cause la prééminence de l’initiative marocaine.

-A cet effet, le SG évoque l’impatience de certaines capitales du Groupe des Amis, et fait référence, de manière abusive, au climat de frustration supposé des jeunes, ce qui reflète sa volonté de favoriser une troisième solution préétablie.

-Il profite également dudit Rapport pour réaffirmer sa lecture du statut de « Territoires non autonomes ».

-Par ailleurs, la soi-disant frustration susmentionnée, pourrait constituer un argument majeur pour resserrer l’étau contre le contrôle du volume de l’assistance humanitaire.

3-Un argumentaire tacite mais certain, visant à l’instauration d’un monitoring

-Le Secrétaire Général appel à une standardisation de la MINURSO, par rapport aux missions existantes.

-Il cherche à préciser sa lecture du mandat de la Minurso afin d’élargir ses missions et obtenir confirmation par le Conseil de Sécurité.

-Le Secrétaire Général n’abandonne pas l’idée d’un mécanisme de monitoring, comme en témoigne les références explicites et récurrentes aux ressources naturelles. Par ce procédé rhétorique, le SG lance un appel déguisé mais appuyé aux acteurs intéressés.

-Le SG rappelle également un principe de l’article 73 de la Charte afin d’apporter une dimension légale et légitime à sa démarche.

-Ainsi, la dissémination progressive, tout au long du Rapport (permettant subtilité et insistance), de mentions au droit de l’Homme1, révèle l’intention manifeste de dépeindre une situation faussement pessimiste et inquiétante dans lesdits territoires, en vue d’aboutir à la conclusion, qu’un mécanisme de monitoring s’avère nécessaire.

-Enfin, pour accroitre la pression sur les parties, il précise l’échéance d’avril 2015 pour réviser le cadre général du processus de négociation lancé en 2007

Question nationale/Rapport du Secrétaire Général

II. Recent developments

Positive elements for Morocco :

2. The situation in Western Sahara […] is generally calm. people can live without fear of a resumption of armed conflict in the medium term

3. Moroccan investment in the infrastructure and in the social and cultural sphere. Public life […]peacefully, without incident

4. Increase number of delegations […] visited the western part of the territory. Morroccan authorities showed increased openness and engagement

5. the CNDH […]deployed observers and tried to defuse tensions and prevent clashes

6. demonstration in Laayoune: Minurso was unable to verify the precise scale of this protest

7. the new model proposed instead centred on the imperatives on sustainability, participatory democracy and social cohesion

10. Small-scale demonstrations in the camps were reported, January 2014, 2 saharans were shot dead during an anti-smuggling operation conduced by Algerian security forces.

Negative elements :

4.On occasion visitors deemed hostile to Morroccan interests were denied access to or expelled from the territory

5. Demonstrations in Laayoune. They were credible reports of heavy-handedness on the part of security forces as well as violence, such as stone-throwing, on the part of the demonstrations.

6. Demonstration in Laayoune: clashes erupted between protesters and the Moroccan security forces, causing an estimated 150 injured on the both sides and a number of arrests.

7. The ESEC’s assessment, highlighted feelings of frustration, impatience and injustice. The report advocated freeing development policy from the constraints of security imperatives and concluded that the development model applied in the Territory in the past had reached its limit.

9. Some degree of dissatisfaction among the population in the refugee camps (near Tindouf) was perceptible, in particular among the youth. growing frustration at the lack of progress in the political field and at the difficult socio economic conditions in the camps

11. The secretary general of the Frente Polisario wrote me repeatedly to condemn Morocco’s exploitation of the Territory’s resources and publicly, the Agreement, which was also the subject of some demonstrations cited earlier.

12. Concerning the condemnation from Frente of Polisario about contracts between Morocco and foreign oil companies. Opinion states: “While the specific contracts which are the subject of the security council’s request activities were to proceed in disregard of the interest and wishes of the people of Western Sahara, they would be in violation of the international law principles applicable to mineral resources activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories.”

Arguments raised

Positive points for Morocco:

-A peaceful and calm atmosphere in the region, which is currently under development.

-A better access to these Territories: via cooperation and transparency of the Moroccan authorities

– violations of the Human Rights by the Algerian security forces, were stressed in the report

Negative points:

-Pressure of Polisario on the Envoy of NU in order to bias his neutrality and objectivity

– demonstrations are testified still repressed by the Moroccan security forces

-The development model in the Territory applied in the past had reached its limits… but the new one aims to be more efficient.

-Repetitive references to the youth’s frustration and natural resources.

III. Activities of my Personal Envoy

A. 2013 Consultations in the region

Positive elements for Morocco

18.Among both supporters and opponents of Morocco’s autonomy proposal, a lake of trust in its implementation was evident

17. President Bouteflika stressed Algeria’s commitment to the principle of self determination as expressed in a referendum. The Frente of Polisario, while initially expressing fear that the idea of compromise played in Favour of Morocco’s autonomy proposal, agreed in the end to engage on the basis of the new approach. The neighbouring states expressed general support, with Algeria again making it clear that it’s not a party to the conflict.

18. Saharans of all political persuasions told[… ] that they feel excluded from the negotiations meant to determine their future

21. My Personal Envoy replied that, while the Council has identified self-determination as one of the two core issues to be addressed, it has not specified the form that this might take.

Frente Polisario officials also noted that, regardless of the final status of Western Sahara, solid international guarantees for the terms of any agreement would be critical.

22. However Saharans of all trends expressed renewed frustration over what they see as the exclusion of indigenous Saharans, whether in the Territory or in the refugee camps, from the negotiating process or their inadequate representation therein. Some went so far as to express the view that neither The Government of Morocco nor the Frente of Polisario truly represents their interests.

24. Algeria […] underscored once again that Algeria will never become a party to the negotiations and that the conflict should be linked neither to the state of Moroccan-Algerian relations nor to the advancement of regional integration.

Arguments raised

Negative point:

The Algerian’s position:

Algeria reaffirms its non-involvement in the conflict and denies any link with the Polisario ;

Algerian disempowerment

– Some Saharans are complaining from the supposed failure, of both sides (Moroccan authorities and Frente Polisario), not sufficiently taking into account the indigenous Saharan’s interests

– The report highlights the Saharans feeling of lacking a true representation in the territories where they live. 

IV. Activities of the MINURSO

Negative elements

35. Minurso observed and recorded six general violations of military agreement by the Royal Moroccan Army, a significant decrease from the previous reporting period, when 42 violations were recorded […] As for Frente Polisario forces; MINURSO recorded one general violation […]

77. The UN continued to receive communications alleging abuses in Western Sahara west of the berm, particularly in the form of arrests without warrants, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in detention, limitations on family and advocate access to detainees, confessions extracted under torture, violation of the right to a air trial, conditions that may amount to enforced disappearance and infringement of the rights of freedom of speech, association and assembly.

79. Civil society organizations, including human rights groups active in Western Sahara west of the berm, continue to face obstacles n registering as nongovernmental organizations despite a judicial decision in their favour.

84. Frente Polisario Secretary General proposed that the High Commissioner for Human Rights visit the refugee camps and Western Sahara itself for a firsthand assessment of the situation. Also, in the refugee camps administered by the Frente Polisario, Secretary General announced the creation of a Sahrawi National Council for Human Rights.

Arguements

Negative points:

-violations of military agreement by the Royal Moroccan Army

D. Human Rights

Positive elements :

71. To reinforce the role and effectiveness of the work of the CNDH and its regional offices in Laayoune and Dakhla, the Moroccan Government announced on 13 March 2014 that henceforth it would respond to all complaints submitted by these bodies within a three-month period

74. The Moroccan authorities continued to cooperate with mandate holders of special procedures of the Human Rights Council and to facilitate their access to Western Sahara.

82. Draft law on military tribunals had been approved by the Government Council and by the Council of Ministers presided by King Mohammed

VI.

83. Camps authorities have taken no action against the protesters camped in front of a UNHCR and within shouting distance of the main road.

Negative elements

77. The UN continued to receive communications alleging abuses in Western Sahara west of the berm, particularly in the form of arrests without warrants, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in detention, limitations on family and advocate access to detainees, confessions extracted under torture, violation of the right to a air trial, conditions that may amount to enforced disappearance and infringement of the rights of freedom of speech, association and assembly.

79. Civil society organizations, including human rights groups active in Western Sahara west of the berm, continue to face obstacles n registering as nongovernmental organizations despite a judicial decision in their favour.

84. Frente Polisario Secretary General proposed that the High Commissioner for Human Rights visit the refugee camps and Western Sahara itself for a firsthand assessment of the situation. Also, in the refugee camps administered by the Frente Polisario, Secretary General announced the creation of a Sahrawi National Council for Human Rights.

Argumenta raised

Positive aspects:

– the Cooperation and the Progress/the Respect of the Human Rights issues by the Moroccan Government, have been highlighted in the report

Negative elements:

– The report identified the alleged violations of human rights committed by the Moroccan side.

VI African Union

Positive elements

87. In 2007, the Council had mandated a process of direct negotiations between the parties under the auspices of the UN. A period of confidential consultations with each party was to begin shortly, and its results would be communicated to the council and other stakeholders as appropriate.

Negative elements

86. The Frente Polisario and Algeria expressed support while Morocco registered its strong opposition, notably in a letter addressed to me by King Mohammed VI.

VII Recommenda-tions

Positive elements

94. If,[..] no progress occurs before april 2015, the time will have come to engage the members of the Council in a comprehensive review of the framework that it provided for the negotiating process in April 2007.

98. I welcome Morocco’s cooperation with the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. I note with satisfaction the steps which Morocco has taken, such as those related to CNDH and the military tribunals.

100. While welcoming these developments, I encourage both parties to continue and further enhance their cooperation with UN human rights bodies. I believe that such actions, covering both western Sahara and the refugee camps, would contribute to creating an environment conducive to the initiatives taken so far, as well as the negotiating process. Such positive developments should contribute to a more balanced and comprehensive monitoring human rights. The end goal nevertheless remains a sustained, independent and impartial human rights monitoring mechanism, covering both the Territory and the camps.

Negative elements

97.In light of increased interest in the natural resources of Western Sahara, it is timely to call upon all relevant actors to “recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount”

99. I also take positive note of the Frente Polisario expressed readiness to cooperate with United Nation Human Rights bodies, and of its establishment of Sahrawi National Human Rights Council.

Tags : Sahara Occidental, Maroc, Front Polisario, ONU, MINURSO, rapport avril 2014,